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Report review · PLZL · IFRS for 2025

Polyus 2025: 16% less gold, costs per ounce twice as high, and yet profit grew

In 2025 Polyus produced 2.53 million ounces of gold — 16% less than a year earlier — and its cash costs per ounce almost doubled. Even so, net profit grew to ₽314 billion: each ounce sold brought in a quarter more rubles, and the stronger ruble “shrank” the yuan debt. The main news of the year, though, is not in the figures: the auditor signed the statements with a qualification, because it could not establish who ultimately controls the company. We read the 51 pages of the statements, the annual report and the reports for the two previous years, and took the year apart line by line.

Statements signed on March 16, 2026 · 12 min read

Revenue, 2025
₽713B+2.6%

2024: ₽695B

Operating profit, 2025
₽418B−7.3%

2024: ₽451B

Net profit, 2025
₽314B+2.8%

2024: ₽306B

Operating cash flow, 2025
₽444B+37.1%

2024: ₽324B

Free cash flow, 2025
₽228B+22.8%

2024: ₽186B

Net debt, 2025
₽649B−9.8%

2024: ₽719B

Cash, 2025
₽139B−13.3%

2024: ₽160B

In short

  • Less gold, more revenue: Polyus produced 2.529 million ounces — 16% less than a year earlier — but revenue grew 2.6% to ₽712.8 billion, because each ounce got more expensive (our calculation) annual report, p. 4 2024 report, p. 3 statements, p. 9 statements, p. 28.
  • Costs per ounce almost doubled: $739 against $383. Why, the annual report does not explain annual report, p. 4.
  • Profit +2.8%, thanks to the exchange rate. Operating profit fell 7.3%, while exchange differences and the revaluation of financial instruments produced a ₽62 billion gain against a ₽36 billion loss a year earlier statements, p. 9.
  • Mineral extraction tax +77%, charity +38%: ₽70.9 billion against ₽40.0 billion, and ₽47.8 billion against ₽34.7 billion statements, p. 30.
  • Dividends for 2025 are below the target so far: ₽101.5 billion has been declared for the half-year and nine months — about 20% of adjusted EBITDA (profit before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation) against a target of 30% (our calculation) statements, p. 39 statements, p. 46 statements, p. 28.
  • The auditor's opinion is qualified: it could not establish who ultimately controls the company, and so could not check deals with “insiders” statements, p. 4 statements, p. 5.

Better or worse?

The short answer: better on cash, worse in the core business. By our rule five of the eight measures improved, two got worse and one did not change. Return on equity is not in the table: after the share buyback in 2023, equity at the end of that year was negative statements, p. 12, so the average equity of 2024 is no good for a comparison.

But almost all of the “better” rests on things miners do not control: the gold price and the ruble's exchange rate. What does depend on them sagged: production fell 16%, operating profit 7%, and the operating margin went from 64.9% to 58.7%.

Better: 5, worse: 2, no change: 1 (of 8 figures)

Figure20252024ChangeIt got
Revenue₽713B₽695B+2.6%better
Operating profit₽418B₽451B−7.3%worse
Net profit₽314B₽306B+2.8%better
Operating cash flow₽444B₽324B+37.1%better
Free cash flow₽228B₽186B+22.8%better
Net debt₽649B₽719B−9.8%better
Operating margin58.7%64.9%−6.2 ppworse
Net margin44.1%44.0%+0.1 ppno change

Compared with 2024 as the same report restates it. "Better" or "worse" is a rule, not an opinion: an amount moved by more than 2%, a ratio by more than 0.5 percentage points; for debt, less is better. Net profit here is the whole profit of the group for the year; the part attributable to the shareholders of Polyus is ₽314B (+2.7% against 2024).

Why profit grew when gold earned less

Let's walk from the 2024 profit to the 2025 profit along the lines of the income statement. The answer shows up almost at once: everything revenue added was eaten by costs, and the growth came from the exchange rate and swaps.

Revenue added ₽18 billion, but costs grew by ₽51 billion, and operating profit fell by ₽33 billion statements, p. 9. Exchange differences and the revaluation of financial instruments, on the other hand, swung by ₽98 billion: from −₽36 billion to +₽62 billion (our calculation) statements, p. 9.

Green bars added to the profit, red bars took away. Each bar is the change of one line of the income statement over the year.Source: statements, p. 9

Squeezed into one sentence: the core business earned ₽33 billion less, while recounting the debt at the new exchange rate gave ₽98 billion more. That is not real money. Should the yuan rise 25% against the ruble, the same line would take away ₽45.6 billion of profit before tax, by the company's own estimate statements, p. 49.

One more detail on the quality of profit: some costs do not reach the expenses yet. The company records stripping — removing the waste rock above the ore — as an asset: ₽60.0 billion over the year against ₽34.3 billion statements, p. 36. At Olimpiada, depreciation of it will rise noticeably from 2029 statements, p. 36. Another ₽7.8 billion of interest was added to the cost of construction instead of expenses statements, p. 37.

A separate word on charity. ₽47.8 billion is almost half of the dividends declared for the half-year and nine months (our calculation) statements, p. 30 statements, p. 39. Who received the money is not disclosed. And the company cleans these donations out of the adjusted EBITDA on which dividends are calculated, so charity does not shrink the base for dividends statements, p. 28.

Where the money goes

Of every ₽100 of revenue in 2025, Polyus spent ₽41.3 on costs and expenses; ₽16.0 went to income tax, other income added ₽1.4, and ₽44.1 was left as net profit.

2025 · rubles · share of revenue
In 2025AmountOf revenue
Revenue₽713B100.0%
Costs and expenses−₽295B41.3%
Operating profit₽418B58.7%
Income tax−₽114B16.0%
Interest and other, net₽10.2B1.4%
Net profit₽314B44.1%

The business: Olimpiada sagged, Natalka grew

Polyus is five operating mines in Siberia and the Russian Far East annual report, p. 2 annual report, p. 6. In 2025 they went different ways. The largest, Olimpiada, sold 926,000 ounces against 1.582 million — 41% less — and its revenue fell by a quarter statements, p. 28. Natalka, on the contrary, sold 24% more, and its revenue grew 55% statements, p. 28.

Why Olimpiada sagged, the 2025 statements do not say statements, p. 28. But as early as its 2023 report the company warned that the fourth stage of the Vostochny pit was coming to an end, the gold grade of the ore was falling, and the mining of antimony-bearing ore, from which the concentrate was made, was stopping 2023 report, p. 3. And so it turned out: in 2024 the concentrate contained 211,000 ounces, in 2025 there was no concentrate at all 2024 report, p. 3 annual report, p. 3. Now the fifth stage of the same pit is being stripped — until 2028 statements, p. 36.

Hence the doubling of costs. Cash costs per ounce (TCC, total cash costs: the cost of gold sold without depreciation) rose from ₽35,900 to ₽60,400 statements, p. 29. The company names no reason annual report, p. 4. The notes show three main ones: fewer ounces were sold, the mineral extraction tax rose by ₽31 billion, and revenue from by-product antimony, which cut costs by ₽12.5 billion in 2024, almost vanished statements, p. 30 statements, p. 29. In dollars the rise is even steeper — from $383 to $739: the company's costs are mostly in rubles, and the ruble strengthened annual report, p. 4 statements, p. 48.

Where it was earned: gold revenue by mine

20252024
Olimpiada (Krasnoyarsk territory)
₽252B
₽343B
−26.6%
Natalka (Magadan region)
₽157B
₽101B
+55.3%
Blagodatnoye (Krasnoyarsk territory)
₽119B
₽110B
+7.7%
Kuranakh (Yakutia)
₽91.9B
₽71.2B
+29.1%
Verninskoye (Irkutsk region)
₽75.2B
₽53.1B
+41.6%
The five lines are all of the gold revenue, 695 billion rubles. Ounces sold: Olimpiada 926 thousand against 1,582 thousand, Natalka 567 thousand against 456 thousand.Source: statements, p. 28

What the gold cost: production costs by kind

20252024
Mineral extraction tax
₽70.9B
₽40B
+77.1%
Depreciation and amortisation
₽46.7B
₽54.3B
−14.0%
Materials and spare parts
₽28.9B
₽32.7B
−11.6%
Staff
₽28.7B
₽25.7B
+11.9%
Repairs and maintenance
₽18.5B
₽8.55B
+115.8%
Fuel
₽11.6B
₽11.8B
−1.5%
Utilities
₽7.96B
₽6.15B
+29.5%
Other
₽10.7B
−₽1.83B
+₽12.5B
The year's costs: 223.9 billion rubles against 177.3 billion; 31.6 billion of them went into stocks of ore and gold in process. A cost that grew is marked red.Source: statements, p. 30

And here is the year in tonnes and ounces. 22% more rock — ore together with waste rock — was mined, but 19% less ore itself: each tonne of ore came with 2.4 cubic metres of waste rock instead of 1.5 annual report, p. 3 2024 report, p. 3. 4% more ore was processed, but 16% less gold was produced — which means there was less of it in each tonne (our calculation; the annual report does not give the gold grade of the ore).

Operating figure20252024ChangeWhere in the report
Gold producedthousand ounces2,528.83,001.6−15.8%annual report, p. 3 2024 report, p. 3
of which gold in flotation concentratethousand ounces; no concentrate was made in 2025−0.5211.0—annual report, p. 3 2024 report, p. 3
Gold soldthousand ounces, not audited2,5353,107−18.4%statements, p. 28
Ore minedthousand tonnes79,38198,026−19.0%annual report, p. 3 2024 report, p. 3
Ore processedthousand tonnes52,62650,527+4.2%annual report, p. 3 2024 report, p. 3
Stripping ratiocubic metres of waste rock per tonne of ore2.41.5+60.0%annual report, p. 3 2024 report, p. 3
Gold recovery%84.684.2+0.5%annual report, p. 3 2024 report, p. 3
Total cash cost per ounce (TCC)US dollars per ounce sold739383+93.0%annual report, p. 4
Total cash cost per ounce (TCC) in rublesrubles per ounce sold, not audited60,35735,857+68.3%statements, p. 29

Cash: enough for construction, not for dividends and interest

In cash the year turned out better than in profit: the core business brought in ₽443.9 billion, 37% more statements, p. 13. The secret lies in what customers owe. In 2024 those debts grew by ₽108 billion; in 2025 they shrank by ₽69 billion statements, p. 13. The buyers of concentrate paid in full: ₽52.4 billion owed at the end of 2024, zero at the end of 2025 statements, p. 38.

Almost half of the flow went into construction: ₽215.5 billion was paid for fixed assets, 56% more statements, p. 13. That left ₽228.5 billion of free cash, while dividends and interest took ₽240.5 billion (our calculation) statements, p. 13. The gap was closed not with loans — over the year the company borrowed ₽0.4 billion and repaid ₽2.6 billion — but with interest received, ₽16.9 billion, and payments received under swaps, ₽21.9 billion (our calculation) statements, p. 13. There was still less money in the bank — ₽139.1 billion against ₽160.4 billion — but that was because yuan balances were recounted at the new rate: −₽27.7 billion statements, p. 13 statements, p. 39.

Operating cash flow
₽444B+37.1%

2024: ₽324B

Capital expenditure
₽215B+56.4%

2024: ₽138B

Free cash flow
₽228B+22.8%

2024: ₽186B · operating cash flow minus capital expenditure

Net debt
₽649B−9.8%

2024: ₽719B · borrowings minus cash

Cash
₽139B−13.3%

2024: ₽160B

Net debt / EBITDA
1.10−0.00

2024: 1.10 · as the company counts it, statements, p. 47

Where the money came from and where it went

20252024
Cash from operations
₽444B
₽324B
+37.1%
Paid for property and equipment (capex)
−₽215B
−₽138B
−₽77.7B
Dividends to shareholders
−₽169B
−₽111B
−₽58.1B
Interest on debt
−₽71.8B
−₽60.6B
−₽11.2B
Bank deposits: placed minus returned
−₽17.2B
−₽95.2B
+₽78B
Loans: raised minus repaid
−₽2.26B
₽58.9B
−₽61.1B
Foreign-currency cash at the new exchange rate
−₽27.7B
₽12.9B
−₽40.6B
Deposits and loans: the difference of two lines of the statement. The rest (interest received, swaps, loans given, the office purchase and other): +37.8 billion rubles in 2025 and +15.6 billion in 2024.Source: statements, p. 13
Operating cash flowCapital expenditureFree cash flow
Rubles, as in the IFRS statements; years without a report are left out.

Careful with capital expenditure: the documents give three different figures for it. The annual report says ₽180.8 billion annual report, p. 3, the cash flow statement ₽215.5 billion statements, p. 13, additions to fixed assets ₽238.0 billion statements, p. 29. The gap between the first and the third is mostly stripping, ₽60.0 billion: the company does not include it in its own capital expenditure statements, p. 29. And the free cash flow in the annual report, ₽246.1 billion, squares with nothing: by the report's own definition it is operating cash flow minus payments for fixed assets, which should come to ₽228.5 billion (our calculation) annual report, p. 4 statements, p. 13. None of the three capital expenditure figures gets you to ₽246.1 billion.

Debt is ₽788.3 billion against ₽879.8 billion statements, p. 41. It fell not because it was repaid: ₽99.7 billion was “written off” by recounting at the new rate statements, p. 42. Net debt as the company counts it is ₽555.3 billion, or 1.1 times annual EBITDA annual report, p. 4. That is less than our figure, because the company also subtracts ₽94.7 billion of bank deposits statements, p. 11. The ceiling set in the loan agreements is 3.5 statements, p. 47.

The key date in the notes is the third year after the reporting one, that is, 2028: it accounts for ₽591.5 billion of the ₽788.4 billion of principal statements, p. 50. Liabilities in yuan come to ₽402.8 billion statements, p. 48. And it is in that same 2028 that the company expects to start mining at Sukhoi Log statements, p. 32.

Against its own history

Revenue and profit in 2025 are records for the whole series. But growth has almost stopped: after +48% in 2024, revenue added 2.6% (our calculation).

The cards show six ratios, and two of them need explaining. Return on equity is 157%, the same as the company itself calculated annual report, p. 4. That is no miracle but the result of tiny equity. In August 2023 the company bought back 29.99% of its own shares for ₽579 billion, and equity went negative 2023 report, p. 93 2023 report, p. 97. For the same reason net debt is 2.4 times equity. And income tax took 26.7% of profit before tax — more than in a normal year for Polyus.

RevenueNet profit
Rubles, as in the IFRS statements; years without a report are left out.
Operating margin
58.7%+5.9 pp vs median
2012: 44.7%2013: 11.2%2014: 39.8%2015: 53.4%2017: 53.4%2018: 52.3%2019: 55.2%2022: 46.7%2023: 58.7%2024: 64.9%2025: 58.7%
20122025

Median of the earlier years: 52.8% (years counted: 10). Number 3 of 11 by size.

Net margin
44.1%+8.6 pp vs median
2012: 33.3%2013: −1.1%2014: −25.5%2015: 46.5%2017: 45.5%2018: 15.8%2019: 48.5%2022: 37.8%2023: 32.2%2024: 44.0%2025: 44.1%
20122025

Median of the earlier years: 35.5% (years counted: 10). Number 4 of 11 by size.

Return on equity (ROE)
157.5%+107.7 pp vs median
2013: −0.6%2014: −18.7%2015: 49.8%2018: 84.9%2019: 167.1%2025: 157.5%
20132025

Median of the earlier years: 49.8% (years counted: 5). Number 2 of 6 by size.

Net debt to equity
238.8%+197.2 pp vs median
2012: −16.5%2013: 8.5%2014: 33.6%2015: 17.8%2017: 469.1%2018: 688.7%2019: 171.7%2022: 41.6%2024: 566.4%2025: 238.8%
20122025

Median of the earlier years: 41.6% (years counted: 9). Number 4 of 10 by size.

Capital expenditure to revenue
30.2%+6.5 pp vs median
2012: 25.5%2013: 57.9%2014: 19.8%2015: 14.3%2017: 30.5%2018: 27.7%2019: 19.3%2022: 30.9%2023: 21.9%2024: 19.8%2025: 30.2%
20122025

Median of the earlier years: 23.7% (years counted: 10). Number 4 of 11 by size.

Effective income tax rate
26.7%+7.7 pp vs median
2012: 21.2%2013: 135.1%2015: 16.0%2017: 19.0%2018: 14.4%2019: 18.3%2022: 18.1%2023: 19.0%2024: 22.3%2025: 26.7%
20122025

Median of the earlier years: 19.0% (years counted: 9). Number 2 of 10 by size.

One bar is one year, the latest in color; the dashed line is the median of the earlier years. Years before the latest two are as first published.

Among Russian miners: the highest margin

Among the Moscow Exchange mining companies whose IFRS reports for 2025 we have, Polyus is the most profitable by a wide margin. Of every ruble of revenue it keeps 59 kopecks (hundredths of a ruble) as operating profit; Nornickel keeps 29, Alrosa 14.

It was a mixed year for the industry. Nornickel and Alrosa, on slightly lower revenue, raised their profit by 22% and 88%. Seligdar, another gold miner, increased its revenue almost one and a half times but ended the year with a loss of ₽10.1 billion, and the coal miner Raspadskaya lost ₽53 billion.

Return on equity is best not compared in this table: Polyus's is inflated by its small equity. The 2025 reports of Rusal, En+ and Yuzhuralzoloto are not in our data yet.

Change in revenue, 2025
Seligdar+48.2%
Polyus+2.6%
Nornickel−1.6%
Alrosa−1.7%
Raspadskaya−25.8%
Change in net profit, 2025
Alrosa+88.3%
Nornickel+22.3%
Polyus+2.8%
Seligdar—
Raspadskaya—
Operating margin
Polyus58.7%
Nornickel28.8%
Seligdar22.7%
Alrosa14.0%
Raspadskaya−52.1%
Net margin
Polyus44.1%
Nornickel18.0%
Alrosa15.4%
Seligdar−11.5%
Raspadskaya−44.5%
Return on equity (ROE)
Polyus157.5%
Nornickel22.0%
Alrosa9.3%
Raspadskaya−32.3%
Seligdar−62.9%
Revenue, 2025
Nornickel₽1.15T
Polyus₽713B
Alrosa₽235B
Raspadskaya₽119B
Seligdar₽87.9B

Calculated by BigCapital from the companies' IFRS statements for 2025; a change is against the year before as the same report shows it. ROE: profit for the year over the average of equity at the start and the end of the year.

Among the world's miners: the smallest, but the most profitable

At the year's average rate Polyus's revenue is about $8.6 billion. It is the smallest company in the comparison: Newmont has $22.7 billion, Rio Tinto $57.6 billion.

By profitability, though, Polyus comes first: net profit is 44% of revenue, against 31% at Newmont and from 5% to 18% at the rest.

The closest in business is Newmont: Rio Tinto, Vale and Freeport-McMoRan mainly mine iron ore and copper. Expensive gold helped both, but in different ways: Newmont's revenue in dollars grew 21% and its profit more than doubled; Polyus's revenue in dollars added 14%, because it sold fewer ounces.

Revenue, 2025, US dollars
Rio Tinto$57.6B
Vale$38.4B
Freeport-McMoRan$25.9B
Newmont$22.7B
Polyus$8.57B
Net profit, 2025, US dollars
Rio Tinto$10.2B
Newmont$7.08B
Polyus$3.78B
Freeport-McMoRan$2.2B
Vale$1.98B
Change in revenue, own currency
Newmont+21.3%
Rio Tinto+7.4%
Polyus+2.6%
Freeport-McMoRan+1.8%
Vale+0.9%

Polyus: in rubles; in dollars at the year's average rate, +14.2%.

Change in net profit, own currency
Newmont+111.6%
Freeport-McMoRan+16.7%
Polyus+14.5%
Rio Tinto−11.4%
Vale−66.8%
Net margin
Polyus44.1%
Newmont31.3%
Rio Tinto17.8%
Freeport-McMoRan8.5%
Vale5.2%
Return on equity (ROE)
Polyus157.5%
Newmont22.2%
Rio Tinto16.4%
Freeport-McMoRan12.1%
Vale5.8%

Foreign companies: their annual reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Forms 10-K and 20-F), SEC EDGAR. Rubles are converted at the Bank of Russia's average official rate: 83.21 rubles per dollar in 2025, 92.66 in 2024.

What the auditor said

This is the main news of the report. The auditor wrote that the statements are prepared correctly “except for the possible effects” of one matter statements, p. 4. The matter is this: it was “unable to obtain sufficient audit evidence regarding the ultimate controlling party” statements, p. 5.

In plain words: the auditor could not find out who ultimately owns and runs the company. And if the owner is unknown, a full list of related parties — companies and people close to the owner and management — cannot be drawn up. That means it is also impossible to check what deals there were with them and on what terms statements, p. 5.

Qualified opinionAuditor: DRT, report dated 16 March 2026 statements, p. 8

The auditor found no errors in revenue, profit or debt — the qualification is not about them. But a year ago the same auditor signed the 2024 statements without qualifications 2024 statements, p. 4, and they had a section on related parties — with at least management's pay, ₽5.8 billion 2024 statements, p. 43. The 2025 statements have no such section at all statements, p. 14–51.

There is also a second paragraph, an emphasis of matter. The statements are “disclosable”: under government resolution No. 1102, whatever could lead to new sanctions was removed from them, and they “do not comply with the requirements” of IFRS statements, p. 5. This did not affect the opinion, but it hides, for example, the names of all five largest subsidiaries statements, p. 51. The report contains no key audit matters statements, p. 4–8.

The main events of the year

What happened during the year and right after it — from the company's own documents.

  1. 3 February 2025Shareholders decided to split the shares, each becoming ten; the split took place on 25 March statements, p. 39.
  2. March 2025A new dividend policy: a target of 30% of adjusted EBITDA, with payments at least twice a year statements, p. 46.
  3. April 2025Kuranakh was added to the register of regional investment projects: the new heap-leach site will get tax breaks statements, p. 32.
  4. 14 April 2025The annual meeting approved the final dividend for 2024 — ₽73 a share — and elected a board of directors with three independent directors statements, p. 39 annual report, p. 9.
  5. September 2025Polyus paid ₽7.0 billion for the company that owns the offices and land it had been renting statements, p. 35.
  6. 30 September 2025Dividend for the first half: ₽70.85 a share, ₽67.3 billion statements, p. 39.
  7. 2025Five cross-currency interest rate swaps were terminated early; the company received ₽15.2 billion under them statements, p. 43.
  8. 23 October 2025The European Union imposed sanctions on the company; US, UK and Australian sanctions have been in force since 19 May 2023 statements, p. 45.
  9. 10 December 2025Dividend for nine months: ₽36 a share, ₽34.2 billion; a new version of the charter was approved statements, p. 39 annual report, p. 9.
  10. 16 March 2026Management approved the statements; the auditor issued a qualified opinion statements, p. 3 statements, p. 4.
  11. 6 May 2026The annual meeting approved the 2025 annual report annual report, p. 1.

Promised — delivered?

We went through Polyus's annual reports for 2023 and 2024, wrote down the promises with a number, a date or a concrete project, and checked them against the documents for 2025.

A caveat: the 2025 annual report is short — 12 pages of text, with no forecasts, deadlines or construction progress annual report, p. 2–12. So we checked some deadlines indirectly, through the tax plans in the statements: the company writes from which year it counts on tax breaks, “taking into account the expected start of production” statements, p. 31.

6 delivered2 plan changed3 the report is silent3 not due yet
deliveredEquity
PromisedAfter the share buyback equity went negative; the company called this temporary and promised to fix it “within the next 1–2 years” 2023 report, p. 97.
What happenedFixed: equity was ₽127.0 billion at the end of 2024 and ₽271.9 billion at the end of 2025 statements, p. 11.
deliveredCosts
PromisedCash costs in 2024 of $450–500 an ounce 2023 report, p. 3.
What happenedThey came to $383, below the forecast. But in 2025 they were already $739 annual report, p. 4.
deliveredProduction
PromisedIn 2024 gold production would fall to 2.7–2.8 million ounces 2023 report, p. 3.
What happenedIt fell less, to 3,001,600 ounces 2024 report, p. 3. The decline came a year later: 2,528,800 in 2025 annual report, p. 3.
deliveredDividends for 2024
PromisedDividend policy: 30% of EBITDA 2023 report, p. 72.
What happenedFor 2024, ₽123.6 billion was declared for nine months and ₽69.3 billion as the final dividend — about 36% of adjusted EBITDA of ₽538.7 billion (our calculation) statements, p. 40 statements, p. 39 statements, p. 28.
deliveredBoard of directors
PromisedAfter the 2025 shareholders' meeting, independent directors would join the board 2024 report, p. 7.
What happenedThree of the nine are independent; the chairman of the board and the chairs of all three committees are independent directors annual report, p. 9.
deliveredSukhoi Log
PromisedTo give an updated schedule and project details in 2024; the earlier estimate of construction costs was $3.3 billion 2023 report, p. 3 2023 report, p. 32.
What happenedGiven: launch in 2028–2029, costs of $6 billion, almost twice the earlier estimate 2024 report, p. 4.
plan changedMill-5
PromisedA new plant at Blagodatnoye: zero mineral extraction tax in 2025–2026, based on the expected start of production 2023 report, p. 89.
What happenedThe tax break is now planned for 2026–2027: the launch has slipped by a year statements, p. 31. In the annual report the plant is still under construction annual report, p. 2.
plan changedKuranakh
PromisedA new heap-leach site: 6.25 million tonnes of ore a year from 2026 and 12.5 million tonnes from 2028 2023 report, p. 7.
What happenedTax breaks for the project are now counted from 2027, “taking into account the expected start of production” — it looks as if the launch is a year later, though the company does not say so directly statements, p. 32.
the report is silentKuranakh
PromisedThe expansion of the existing leaching site from 1.5 to 5.0 million tonnes a year will be completed in 2025 and add 50,000–60,000 ounces a year 2023 report, p. 7.
What happenedIn the 2025 report the expansion is still on the list of projects in development; completion is not mentioned annual report, p. 2. Kuranakh's sales were 330,000 ounces against 327,000 statements, p. 28.
the report is silentNatalka
PromisedTo introduce flotation at Natalka by 2025, adding 25,000–45,000 ounces a year 2023 report, p. 8.
What happenedThe 2025 documents are silent about flotation at Natalka. Natalka's sales rose to 567,000 ounces from 456,000, but the statements give no reason statements, p. 28.
the report is silentNew deposits
PromisedIn 2025, investment decisions on Chulbatkan and Chertovo Koryto, with both to be launched in 2029 2024 report, p. 4.
What happenedThe documents report no decisions: the projects are still “being worked out”, and the date is not repeated annual report, p. 6. Accumulated exploration costs keep growing: at Chulbatkan, ₽15.8 billion against ₽12.2 billion statements, p. 37.
not due yetSukhoi Log
PromisedLaunch in 2028–2029, 2.3–2.8 million ounces of gold a year 2024 report, p. 4.
What happenedThe 2025 report repeats the capacity but not the deadline or the costs annual report, p. 4. The tax plan in the statements still assumes production starts in 2028; exploration and evaluation costs on the balance sheet have reached ₽79.4 billion against ₽58.5 billion statements, p. 32 statements, p. 37.
not due yetGrowth
PromisedBy 2030, double output to 6 million ounces a year and become the world's second-largest gold producer 2024 report, p. 4.
What happenedThis goal is gone from the 2025 report. So far things are moving the other way: 2,528,800 ounces against 3,001,600 annual report, p. 3 2024 report, p. 3.
not due yetDividends for 2025
PromisedNew policy: 30% of adjusted EBITDA, with payments at least twice a year statements, p. 46.
What happened₽101.5 billion has been declared for the half-year and nine months — about 20% of the year's EBITDA of ₽517.8 billion (our calculation). There is no final dividend in the documents yet statements, p. 39 statements, p. 28.

The picture is this. Polyus keeps its financial promises: equity is back above zero, 2024 costs came in below the forecast, and dividends for 2024 were above the target. Construction is another matter: the tax plans show that Mill-5 and the new Kuranakh site have slipped by a year, and the Sukhoi Log date, the 6 million ounce target and the promised decisions on two new deposits have vanished from the annual report.

What the company itself says

The 2025 annual report is short: 12 pages of text, the rest is appendices annual report, p. 2–12. Nowhere does it compare with the year before, except in one line on costs per ounce annual report, p. 4. Here is its essence in six points.

  • Who we are: the largest gold producer in Russia, among the world's top five and with the “lowest costs” among the leading producers annual report, p. 2.
  • Costs in one sentence: the company has “one of the lowest in the world” cash costs, $739 an ounce against $383 a year earlier; the report does not comment on the almost twofold increase annual report, p. 4.
  • The great hope is Sukhoi Log: 43.5 million ounces of reserves, the most powerful processing plant in Russia and growth of more than 20% in the whole country's gold production annual report, p. 4.
  • Construction at operating mines: Mill-5, a gold recovery plant for 8.0 million tonnes of ore a year, the expansion of Kuranakh from 1.5 to 5.0 million tonnes, and a new leaching site for 12.5 million tonnes annual report, p. 2.
  • Reserves: second in the world at 105.2 million ounces, but as estimated at the end of 2024 annual report, p. 6.
  • Money and dividends: the debt load is “comfortable”, and dividends are paid “subject to the factors” of the policy — without a single figure annual report, p. 7.

What the report is silent about

  • Why production fell 16% and costs per ounce almost doubled annual report, p. 3 annual report, p. 4.
  • The launch date and cost of Sukhoi Log, the target of 6 million ounces by 2030, the decisions on Chulbatkan and Chertovo Koryto — all of which were in the 2024 report 2024 report, p. 4.
  • Guidance for 2026: nothing on production, costs or capital expenditure annual report, p. 11.
  • The gold price, the ruble's exchange rate, taxes and sanctions; the EU sanctions of 23 October 2025 are mentioned only in the statements statements, p. 45.
  • Who received the ₽47.8 billion of charitable donations statements, p. 30.
  • Who buys the gold: more than 90% of it is sold to “a few main customers”, unnamed statements, p. 50.
  • Who owns the company: the report names no shareholders or their stakes, and the auditor could not establish the ultimate owner statements, p. 5.

What we will check in a year

Here is what to come back to when the next report is out.

What is promisedDue
The final dividend for 2025: about ₽54 billion short of the target of 30% of adjusted EBITDA (our calculation) statements, p. 46 statements, p. 282026
The launch of Mill-5 at Blagodatnoye, 8.0 million tonnes of ore a year; the tax breaks are planned from 2026 annual report, p. 2 statements, p. 312026
The end of tax breaks at Natalka: income tax of 25% instead of 10%, and the reduced mineral extraction tax rate runs out statements, p. 32; a year ago the income tax break was expected to last until 2028 2024 statements, p. 312026
New independent directors after the annual meeting annual report, p. 92026
Repayment of ₽591.5 billion of principal — three quarters of all loans and borrowings statements, p. 502028
The launch of Sukhoi Log: 34 million tonnes of ore and 2.3–2.8 million ounces of gold a year annual report, p. 4 2024 report, p. 42028–2029 (the date from the 2024 report)

Sources and how we counted

The original documents are on the disclosure site; we do not copy them, we link to them:

  • The figures are taken from the company's statements; a comparison with the year before uses the prior-year column of the same report, so the company's own restatements are already in.
  • Margins, return on equity, free cash flow and net debt are calculated by BigCapital from those figures. Net debt here is borrowings minus cash; the company has its own method, and its figure is shown separately.
  • The reasons for the changes come only from the company's documents; each has its page (page numbers are those of the PDF file). Where a report names no reason, we say so.
  • The "better" and "worse" marks are arithmetic by one rule, not an opinion, and not advice to buy or sell shares.
  • Peers: Russian companies by their IFRS statements for the same year, world companies by their reports to the SEC.

Polyus: every year — revenue, profit, balance sheet

For information only, not investment advice.

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