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Unsolved mysteries of economics

Some questions in economics come with clues, suspects and no verdict. Here are 6 of them, each with its evidence: the long-term interest rate slid from 13.9% in 1981 to 0.89% in 2020, the swings of US growth shrank by 57% after 1984, and labor's share of business income stands 15.8% below its 1947–1999 average. Economists have suspects for every case. None is closed.

Updated with Oct 2026 data14 min read

Cases on the board
6

2 open, 2 reopened, 2 partly explained. Not one is closed.

Long-term rate at its 2020 low
0.89%

down from 13.9% in 1981; 2026 so far: 4.54%

Swings of US growth after 1984
−57%

typical quarterly swing: 4.8 points before, 2.1 in 1984–2007

Consumer prices a year, 2007–2019
1.7%

while the money stock M2 grew 6.2% a year: the missing inflation

Labor's share of business income
−15.8%

Q3 2026 against the 1947–1999 average; the lowest since 1947

Economics has closed plenty of cases: why prices soar when money is printed by the wheelbarrow, why trade pays, why bank runs spread. The files below are different. Each has a clear clue in the data, several respectable suspects, and economists who have spent careers accusing one or another. We lay out the evidence and the suspects. We don't name a culprit.

A word on the stamps. Open: there is no agreed answer. Partly explained: most economists accept some of the suspects and still argue about the rest. Reopened is stamped by the data, not by us: recent numbers have revived a case that had gone quiet.

Case 01ReopenedA. W. Phillips, 1958 · Samuelson and Solow, 1960

The vanishing Phillips curve

Low unemployment used to mean rising prices. Then the link went missing.

In 1958 A. W. Phillips showed that in Britain, from 1861 to 1957, money wages rose faster in years when unemployment was low. In 1960 Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow drew the American version with prices and offered policymakers a menu: a little more inflation for a little less unemployment. The 1960s fit the menu: in annual US data, each point of unemployment less came with about 1.15 points more inflation (correlation −0.84).

Then the menu fell apart. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s the slope even turned positive: inflation and unemployment rose and fell together, as Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps had warned in 1967–68. Once people expect inflation, they build it into wages and prices, and the trade-off evaporates. The 2010s were the strangest decade of all: unemployment fell from 9.6% in 2010 to 3.7% in 2019 while inflation stayed between 0.1% and 3.1%. Slope: +0.08, a line almost flat.

Then came the 2020s. With unemployment down to 3.6% in 2023, inflation reached 8.0% in 2022, and the decade so far has a slope of −0.80, about 10 times as steep as the 2010s. Did the curve come back from the dead, or did a pandemic, tangled supply chains and an energy shock only make it look alive?

Exhibit A−1.15slope in the 1960s: the textbook tilt
Exhibit B+0.08slope in the 2010s, the flattest decade
Exhibit C−0.80slope in the 2020s so far
One yearFit: the textbook tiltFit: tilted the other way
Each dot is a year: the year's average unemployment rate across, inflation (change of the year's average CPI) up. The same scales in every panel. Line: least-squares fit within the decade. Data: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain)
The decades in numbers
DecadeUnemployment, averageInflation, averageSlopeCorrelation
1950s1950–19594.5%2.1%−0.50−0.27
1960s1960–19694.8%2.3%−1.15−0.84
1970s1970–19796.2%7.1%+0.33+0.14
1980s1980–19897.3%5.6%+0.20+0.08
1990s1990–19995.8%3.0%+0.44+0.43
2000s2000–20095.5%2.6%−0.70−0.86
2010s2010–20196.2%1.8%+0.08+0.22
2020s*2020–20254.8%3.9%−0.80−0.60

Slope: the change in inflation, in points, that came with one point more of unemployment; negative is the textbook trade-off. * An unfinished decade: full years so far.

The suspectsthe main explanations, in no order of guilt

  1. #1Anchored expectationsFriedman, 1968 · Phelps, 1967Once people trust the central bank to hold inflation near its target, firms and workers set prices by that, not by how many people are out of work.
  2. #2GlobalizationRogoff, 2003Imports and global supply chains cap what domestic firms can charge, however tight the local job market.
  3. #3The Fed hides the curveMcLeay and Tenreyro, 2019A central bank that cools the economy whenever inflation rises wipes the pattern out of the data, even if the link still works underneath.
  4. #4A bent curvePhillips's own 1958 curve was bentInflation may barely react while there are idle workers and jump once jobs get very hard to fill, which would fit both the quiet 2010s and the jump of 2021–22.
  5. #5The wrong yardstickthe natural-rate debateThe unemployment rate may miss slack, such as people who stopped looking, and the “natural” rate itself may drift, shifting the whole curve.

StatusReopenedThe flat decades made the case look closed; the 2020s reopened it. With a pandemic in the data, nobody can yet tell a comeback from a coincidence.

Case 02Partly explainedStock and Watson, 2002 · Bernanke, 2004

The Great Moderation

Around 1984 the US economy suddenly calmed down. Nobody announced it, and nobody can say for sure why.

Measure how much quarterly growth of real GDP jumps around: its standard deviation, in points of growth at an annual rate. From Q2 1947 to Q4 1983 it was 4.8; from Q1 1984 to Q4 2007, only 2.1, 57% less. Recessions grew rare as well: 8 recessions began in the 37 years before, 2 in the 24 years of calm.

James Stock and Mark Watson named it the Great Moderation in 2002; in 2004 Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, gave a well-known speech that credited better monetary policy, at least in part. Within four years came the deepest recession since the 1930s, and in 2020 the sharpest quarterly fall in the data since 1947: −28.0 at an annual rate in Q2 2020. The biggest jump, +34.9, came in Q3 2020.

So did the calm end? Since 2008 the swings measure 5.7, but leave out the pandemic quarters of 2020–2021 and they shrink to 2.3, about as calm as the Moderation itself (2.1). The calmest five years in the data ended in Q4 2019 (a swing of 1.1); the latest five, to Q3 2026, measure 1.8.

Exhibit A4.8typical swing, Q2 1947 – Q4 1983
Exhibit B2.1typical swing, Q1 1984 – Q4 2007
Exhibit C2.3since 2008, leaving out 2020–2021
Quarter of growthQuarter of declineEra's typical rangeRecession (NBER)
Bars: growth of real GDP in each quarter, at an annual rate; bars beyond ±20 points are cut and labelled. Shaded band: the typical range of each era (its average ± one standard deviation). Strip below: volatility over the previous five years; the deeper the color, the wilder. Data: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain) Recession dates: NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee
Volatility by era
EraTypical swing (std. dev., points)Average growth, annual rateRecessions begun
BeforeQ2 1947 – Q4 19834.83.7%8
Great ModerationQ1 1984 – Q4 20072.13.3%2
Since 2008Q1 2008 – Q3 20265.72.2%2
The same, leaving out 2020–2021Q1 2008 – Q3 20262.3——

The suspectsthe main explanations, in no order of guilt

  1. #1Better monetary policyClarida, Galí and Gertler, 2000From Paul Volcker on, the Fed fought inflation earlier and harder, so booms and busts stayed smaller.
  2. #2Good luckStock and Watson, 2002Smaller shocks to oil, food and productivity: a quieter world, not a wiser one. The storms of 2008 and 2020 suit this suspect well.
  3. #3Smarter inventoriesMcConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000Computers and just-in-time supply cut the stockpiling swings that used to amplify every cycle.
  4. #4Services take overthe structural-change viewHaircuts, software and health care swing less than steel mills and car plants.
  5. #5Easier creditDynan, Elmendorf and Sichel, 2006Households and firms could borrow through bad quarters, until the debt itself became the shock of 2008.

StatusPartly explainedMost studies credit both better policy and good luck, and argue about the split. 2008 and 2020 handed the luck camp fresh evidence.

Case 03ReopenedBernanke, 2005 · Summers, 2013

The great fall of interest rates

For 39 years the price of borrowing slid almost without pause. Nobody agrees why.

Robert Shiller's series of the long-term US interest rate goes back to 1871. Its highest year was 1981, at 13.9%. Over the next 39 years it fell in 25 of them, a staircase going down, to 0.89% in 2020, the lowest of all 155 full years in the data.

Part of the fall is no mystery: inflation fell too, and lenders ask for less when they expect prices to rise less. Over the ten years to 1981 prices rose 8.6% a year; over the ten years to 2020, 1.7%. That accounts for about 6.9 of the 13.0 points. The other 6.1 points are a fall in the real rate, the price of time itself, seen in most rich countries at about the same time. That part is the mystery.

Then the trend turned. So far in 2026 the long rate has averaged 4.54% (Oct 2026: 5.24%), 3.6 points above the low and the highest yearly level since 2007. Was the 39-year slide a one-off, or will the forces behind it pull rates back down?

Exhibit A13.9%the peak year, 1981
Exhibit B0.89%the low, 2020
Exhibit C4.54%2026 so far
Long-term rate, yearly averageInflation over the previous 10 years, a year
Yearly averages of the monthly long-term rate: from 1953 the 10-year Treasury yield, earlier long-term government bond yields; 2026 is the average of its 10 months so far. Dashed: average yearly inflation over the previous ten years. The gap between the two lines is a rough real rate. Data: Robert J. Shiller, Yale University
The long rate by decade
DecadeAverage rateHighest yearLowest year
1870s1871–18794.87%5.53%18734.13%1879
1880s1880–18893.58%3.87%18803.44%1889
1890s1890–18993.49%3.73%18933.12%1899
1900s1900–19093.47%3.83%19093.13%1900
1910s1910–19194.26%4.72%19193.94%1910
1920s1920–19293.98%5.02%19203.34%1927
1930s1930–19392.93%3.51%19322.29%1939
1940s1940–19492.32%2.47%19432.09%1940
1950s1950–19593.03%4.33%19592.40%1954
1960s1960–19694.67%6.67%19693.88%1961
1970s1970–19797.50%9.44%19796.16%1971
1980s1980–198910.60%13.91%19817.68%1986
1990s1990–19996.66%8.55%19905.26%1998
2000s2000–20094.46%6.03%20003.26%2009
2010s2010–20192.40%3.21%20101.80%2012
2020s*2020–20263.18%4.54%20260.89%2020

* An unfinished decade.

The suspectsthe main explanations, in no order of guilt

  1. #1A global saving glutBernanke, 2005Savings from China, oil exporters and other surplus countries poured into safe bonds and pushed their yields down.
  2. #2AgingCarvalho, Ferrero and Nechio, 2016Longer lives and fewer young borrowers: more people saving for retirement, fewer taking out loans.
  3. #3Secular stagnationSummers, 2013, after Hansen, 1938Slower growth of productivity and population leaves fewer profitable projects, so savings wait at ever lower rates.
  4. #4A shortage of safe assetsCaballero, Farhi and Gourinchas, 2017The world wants more safe bonds than safe governments issue; their prices rise and their yields fall.
  5. #5The saving glut of the richMian, Straub and Sufi, 2021A growing share of income goes to the people who save most of it.
  6. #6The central banksthe QE viewYears of near-zero policy rates and bond buying held long rates down, though the slide began decades before QE.

StatusReopenedThe suspects explain a slow slide over decades. The climb since 2020 has suspects of its own: inflation, heavy government borrowing, an investment boom. No verdict on either.

Case 04Partly explainedIrving Fisher, 1911 · Janet Yellen, 2017

The case of the missing inflation

After 2008 money grew fast for a decade and prices barely noticed. After 2020 it grew faster still, and this time they did.

From Q4 2007 to Q4 2019 the Federal Reserve bought trillions of dollars of bonds (quantitative easing), and the money stock M2, cash plus bank deposits, grew 6.2% a year: it multiplied by 2.05. Old-school monetarism said prices would follow. Consumer prices rose 1.7% a year. In 2017 Fed chair Janet Yellen publicly called the shortfall of inflation a mystery.

The money did not vanish; it slowed down. Irving Fisher's equation of exchange says money × velocity = prices × real output, where velocity is how many times a year an average dollar of M2 pays for GDP. US velocity peaked at 2.19 in Q3 1997 and sank to 1.13 by Q2 2020. In the ledger below, each era's new money is split into what it bought: higher prices, more real output, or nothing at all, because it sat still.

Then came Q4 2019 – Q4 2022. M2 grew 26.8% in the year to February 2021, the fastest since the series begins in 1960, and this time prices followed: consumer prices rose 9.0% in the year to June 2022, the most since November 1981. Since Q4 2022 the story has run backwards: money grew only 2.3% a year while velocity rose 3.3% a year. The money that sat idle went back to work.

Exhibit A6.2%M2 a year, 2007–2019
Exhibit B1.7%consumer prices a year, the same years
Exhibit C−2.6%velocity a year, the same years

Follow the money: where each era's new money went

M2 grewIdle money spent again (velocity rose)Prices roseReal output grewSat idle (velocity fell)
For each era the top bar is what came in (growth of M2, plus idle money spent again when velocity rose) and the bottom bar is where it went (higher prices, more real output, or money that sat idle as velocity fell). Rates a year, continuously compounded so that the pieces add up exactly. Prices: the GDP deflator. Data: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain) Data: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain) Data: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain)
The ledger in ordinary yearly rates
EraM2VelocityPrices (GDP deflator)Real GDPConsumer prices (CPI)
Before the crisisQ1 1959 – Q4 2007+6.9%+0.2%+3.6%+3.4%+4.2%
The QE yearsQ4 2007 – Q4 2019+6.2%−2.6%+1.5%+1.8%+1.7%
The pandemicQ4 2019 – Q4 2022+11.8%−4.4%+4.8%+2.0%+5.0%
After the surgeQ4 2022 – Q3 2026+2.3%+3.3%+3.0%+2.7%+3.1%

Velocity: how fast a dollar travels

Velocity climbed for decades as cards, cash machines and money-market funds let people keep less idle cash. It peaked at 2.19 in Q3 1997, slid through the years of low rates, hit 1.13 in Q2 2020 and stood at 1.42 in Q3 2026. Why it moves so much is part of the mystery: it tends to rise with interest rates, when holding cash costs more, and to sink when rates are near zero.

GDP in current dollars divided by M2 (the quarter's average), each quarter. Data: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain) Data: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain)

The suspectsthe main explanations, in no order of guilt

  1. #1Reserves, not spendingthe banking viewQE paid for bonds with bank reserves, which never leave the banking system; the relief checks of 2020–21 landed in household accounts instead.
  2. #2Cheap to holdBaumol, 1952 · Tobin, 1956With interest rates near zero, holding cash costs almost nothing, so people and firms held more of it and velocity fell.
  3. #3Anchored expectationsthe credibility viewEveryone expected about 2% and behaved accordingly, until the shocks of 2021 broke the spell.
  4. #4Idle capacity vs. shortagesthe demand-and-supply viewAfter 2008 there were idle workers and factories; in 2021 there were chip shortages, clogged ports and an energy shock.
  5. #5Velocity is just unstablethe critics of monetarismMoney and prices drift apart for years at a time; in 2000 the Fed stopped setting target ranges for money growth.

StatusPartly explainedMost economists blame low rates and idle reserves for the quiet 2010s and a mix of demand and supply for 2021–22. How much each mattered is still argued.

Case 05OpenKaldor, 1961 · Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014

The shrinking labor share

Economists used to treat workers' slice of the pie as a constant of nature. It isn't.

In 1961 Nicholas Kaldor listed a steady labor share among the “stylized facts” of economic growth. In US business it did stay within a narrow band for half a century: the share of income paid out as wages, salaries and benefits (a BLS index, 2017 = 100) averaged 111.3 from 1947 to 1999 and never fell below 106.8.

Since 2000 it has averaged 101.8. In Q3 2026 it stood at 93.7, 15.8% below the old average, the lowest reading since the series began in 1947. Put another way: from Q1 2000 to Q3 2026 output per hour rose 71%, while pay per hour, counted in the prices of what business sells, rose 42%.

Exhibit A111.3average index, 1947–1999
Exhibit B93.7latest, Q3 2026
Exhibit C+42%pay per hour in output prices since Q1 2000, against +71% for output per hour
Labor share (index, 2017 = 100)1947–1999 averageRecession (NBER)
BLS index of labor compensation as a share of current-dollar output of the nonfarm business sector, 2017 = 100, quarterly. Dashed: the 1947–1999 average. Shaded: recessions. Data: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain) Recession dates: NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee
The labor share by decade
DecadeAverage indexAgainst the 1947–1999 average
1940s1947–1949114.4+2.8%
1950s1950–1959113.1+1.6%
1960s1960–1969112.0+0.6%
1970s1970–1979111.1−0.2%
1980s1980–1989110.4−0.8%
1990s1990–1999109.0−2.1%
2000s2000–2009106.6−4.2%
2010s2010–201999.5−10.6%
2020s*2020–202697.8−12.1%

* An unfinished decade: quarters to Q3 2026.

Output per hour and pay per hour

The same story as a pair of scissors. Both lines start at 100 in Q1 1947. Output per hour is what an hour of work produces; pay per hour in output prices is what that hour earns, counted in the same prices. Their ratio is the labor share, so every bit of daylight between them is the part of the gains that went elsewhere.

Output per hourPay per hour, in output prices
Indexes, Q1 1947 = 100. Pay per hour in output prices = output per hour × labor share (both BLS). Data: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (public domain)

The suspectsthe main explanations, in no order of guilt

  1. #1Cheaper machinesKarabarbounis and Neiman, 2014As computers and equipment got cheaper, firms swapped work done by people for work done by capital.
  2. #2GlobalizationElsby, Hobijn and Şahin, 2013Labor-heavy production moved abroad, and the threat of moving held down pay at home.
  3. #3Superstar firmsAutor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson and Van Reenen, 2020Winner-take-most markets shift sales to a few lean, very profitable companies with small payrolls for their size.
  4. #4Weaker bargaining powerthe institutions viewFewer union members and fewer competing employers in many towns leave workers a smaller share of the gains.
  5. #5MeasurementRognlie, 2015 · Koh, Santaeulàlia-Llopis and Zheng, 2020Depreciation, housing, software and other intangibles, and the pay of the self-employed all bend the numbers; part of the fall may be bookkeeping.

StatusOpenThe share has fallen in many countries; how much is technology, trade, market power or bookkeeping is not settled.

Case 06OpenSolow, 1956 · Pritchett, 1997

The late catch-up of poor countries

Theory says poor countries should catch up with rich ones. For decades the data refused to cooperate.

Robert Solow's growth model (1956) implies that where machines are scarce, each new one adds more, so poorer countries should grow faster and close the gap. Yet from 1960 to 2000 only 23 of 74 countries in the poorer half of the 149 in the Maddison Project data grew faster per person than the United States, which managed 2.4% a year. In 1997 Lant Pritchett summed up the long view in a title: “Divergence, Big Time”.

From 2000 to 2022 it was 68 of 83. Most of the poorer half was gaining on the US at last. Part of the change is the United States slowing down, from 2.4% a year to 1.1%; part is poorer countries speeding up: their median growth went from 1.4% a year to 2.7%.

Across all countries the link between starting income and later growth is weak in both eras: a ten times richer start came with +0.32 points of growth a year in 1960–2000 and −0.46 in 2000–2022. The sign flipped from divergence to convergence, but the dots sit far from the line (correlation −0.13).

Exhibit A31%of poorer countries outgrew the US in 1960–2000
Exhibit B82%did so in 2000–2022
Exhibit C1.1%US growth per person a year since 2000, against 2.4% before
Poorer half at the startRicher halfUS growth
Each dot is a country: GDP per person at the start of the era (log scale, 2011 international dollars) across, growth per person a year up. Dashed: US growth. Blue: the poorer half at the start. Data: Maddison Project Database 2023 (Bolt and van Zanden), CC BY 4.0 · original sources · calculations: BigCapital
The two eras in numbers
EraCountriesUS growth a yearPoorer half outgrowing the USMedian growth, poorer halfMedian growth, richer halfSlope (points per ten times richer start)
1960–20001492.36%23 / 7431%1.35%2.30%+0.32
2000–20221661.11%68 / 8382%2.66%1.88%−0.46

The suspectsthe main explanations, in no order of guilt

  1. #1Better policiesKremer, Willis and You, 2022Tamer inflation, lighter debts and more open trade in many poorer countries since the 1990s.
  2. #2China's appetitethe commodity-boom viewChina's boom raised demand and prices for the oil, metals and crops that many poorer countries sell.
  3. #3Leapfrogging technologythe diffusion viewMobile phones, the internet and cheap equipment spread far faster than railways and power plants once did.
  4. #4The rich slowed downthe slowdown viewPart of the catch-up is the rich world's own slowdown, not a sprint by the poor.
  5. #5Conditional all alongBarro, 1991 · Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992Poor countries catch up only once schooling, saving and institutions are in place; it took time for enough of them to qualify.

StatusOpenWhether the catch-up since 2000 is a new era or a commodity-boom blip is still argued.

Questions people ask

What is the Phillips curve, and does it still work?

It is the trade-off between unemployment and inflation that A. W. Phillips found in 1958: fewer people out of work, faster-rising wages and prices. In US annual data of the 1960s each point less of unemployment came with about 1.15 points more inflation; in the 2010s the slope was +0.08, almost nothing; in the 2020s so far it is −0.80. Economists disagree on whether the curve is dead, flat or just hidden by central banks.

Why were interest rates so low for so long?

No one knows for sure. The US long-term rate fell from 13.9% in 1981 to 0.89% in 2020. Lower inflation explains about 6.9 of those 13.0 points; the rest is blamed on a global saving glut, aging populations, slower growth, a shortage of safe assets, the saving of the rich and central-bank bond buying, in proportions still argued over. So far in 2026 the rate averages 4.54%.

Why didn't QE cause inflation?

Mostly because the new money was held rather than spent. From Q4 2007 to Q4 2019 M2 grew 6.2% a year but its velocity fell 2.6% a year, so spending grew far less than money, and consumer prices rose 1.7% a year. QE itself created bank reserves, which stay inside the banking system. In 2020–21 new money reached households directly, at a time of supply shortages, and consumer prices rose 9.0% in the year to June 2022.

What was the Great Moderation?

The calm stretch of the US economy from 1984 to 2007: the typical swing of quarterly GDP growth (its standard deviation, at an annual rate) fell from 4.8 points to 2.1, and recessions became rare and mild. The 2008 crisis ended it. Leave out the pandemic quarters, though, and the swings since 2008 measure 2.3, so whether the calm really ended is itself debated.

Why is the labor share falling?

Nobody knows exactly. The BLS index of labor's share of US business income averaged 111.3 in 1947–1999 and stood at 93.7 in Q3 2026. The leading suspects are cheaper machines and software, globalization, a few very profitable superstar firms, the weaker bargaining power of workers and measurement issues; studies disagree on how much each matters.

Go deeper

Economic paradoxesThrift, Jevons, Simpson, the equity premium and more, measured Fed interest rate historyEvery hike and cut of the federal funds rate Unemployment rateThe jobless rate through every recession The history of the world economyThe hockey stick of income per person

How the numbers are calculated

  • Unemployment rate (UNRATE), consumer prices (CPI-U, CPIAUCSL), output per hour (OPHNFB) and the labor share (PRS85006173) of the nonfarm business sector: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. US government work, public domain.
  • Real GDP (GDPC1) and GDP in current dollars (GDP): U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. US government work, public domain.
  • Money stock M2 (M2SL): Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, H.6 Money Stock Measures, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Public domain. Seasonally adjusted. The Fed changed the definition in May 2020 (savings deposits moved into M1 and stayed in M2).
  • Recession dates: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Business Cycle Dating Committee, US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.
  • The long-term interest rate (from 1953 the 10-year Treasury yield, earlier long-term government bond yields) and US consumer prices since 1871: Robert J. Shiller, Online Data, Yale University.
  • GDP per person by country: Maddison Project Database, version 2023, by Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen), licensed under CC BY 4.0. Citation: MPD version 2023: Bolt, Jutta and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024). Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update. Journal of Economic Surveys, 1–41, doi:10.1111/joes.12618. Growth rates, medians and slopes are BigCapital's calculations.
  • Phillips curve: yearly averages of the monthly unemployment rate and of CPI-U; inflation is the change of the yearly average CPI from the year before. A year counts with at least 11 published months (Oct 2025 was never published and is left out). Slope and correlation: least squares of inflation on unemployment within each calendar decade that has at least 5 full years.
  • Volatility: the standard deviation of quarterly real GDP growth at an annual rate, ((this quarter ÷ last quarter)⁴ − 1). Eras: Q2 1947 – Q4 1983, Q1 1984 – Q4 2007 (the break dated by Kim and Nelson, 1999, and McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000) and from 2008. The strip uses the 20 quarters to each date. Recessions: NBER dates, each counted in the era in which it began.
  • Long rate: yearly averages of Shiller's monthly long-term rate; 2026 is the average of its 10 months so far. Inflation before a year: the compound yearly rate of Shiller's CPI over the 120 months to its December (or latest month). The rate minus that inflation is a rough, backward-looking real rate.
  • Ledger: quarterly averages of monthly M2; velocity = GDP in current dollars ÷ M2; prices = the GDP deflator (GDP in current dollars ÷ real GDP), so money × velocity = prices × real output holds exactly. The bars use continuously compounded rates, 100 × ln(end ÷ start) ÷ years, so the pieces add up; the text and the table give ordinary yearly rates. Consumer prices: quarterly averages of CPI-U. Era bounds (quarters): Q1 1959, Q4 2007, Q4 2019, Q4 2022, Q3 2026.
  • Labor share: the BLS index (2017 = 100) of labor compensation over current-dollar output of the nonfarm business sector. Pay per hour in output prices = output per hour × labor share, both as indexes. Averages are of quarters.
  • Catch-up: countries with Maddison estimates in both years of an era; former states published next to their successors are left out (SUN, CSK, YUG). Growth: the compound yearly rate of real GDP per person. Poorer half: countries below the era's median starting income. Slope: least squares of growth on the base-10 logarithm of starting income.
  • The stamps: “Open” and “Partly explained” sum up the state of the economic literature as we read it. “Reopened” is set by the data: for the Phillips curve when the latest decade's slope is negative and at least 2 times as steep as the decade before, for interest rates when the latest year averages 2 points or more above the low.
  • This is history and statistics, not a forecast. Nothing here is investment advice.
Original sources of the Maddison Project estimates

The Maddison Project asks that all original papers be cited when its data is shown in charts. Here they are, as the database lists them: first the sources added since 2013, then Angus Maddison's own (2010).

Sources added since 2013

  • GDP pc: 2008 - 2022: Total Economy Database the Conference Board for all countries included in TED. Otherwise UN national accounts statistics
  • Population sources
  • 1990 onward Total Economy Database the Conference Board for all countries included in TED. Otherwise UN national accounts statistics
  • Argentina — 1800 - 1870: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307 (updated data); 1870 - 1900: Bertola, L and Ocampo, J.A. (2012) The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford, Oxford U.P
  • Belgium — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1500- 1846: Buyst, E. (2011), “Towards Estimates of Long Term Growth in the Southern Low Countries, ca.1500-1846”, Results presented at the Conference on Quantifying Long Run Economic Development, Venice, 22-24 March, 2011
  • Bulgaria — 1892-1945: Ivanov, M. (2006). “Bulgarian National Income between 1892 and 1924,” Bulgarian National Discussion Papers DP/54/2006
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Bolivia (Plurinational State of) — 1846-1950: Herranz-Loncán, A. and Peres-Cajías (2016). “Bolivian GDP per capita since the mid-nineteenth century” Cliometrica 10: 99-128
  • Brazil — 1800 - 1870: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307 (updated data); 1850–1899: Barro, R.J. and J.F. Ursua, (2008). “Macroeconomic Crises since 1870” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 255-350
  • Switzerland — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1850-2011: Stohr, Christian (2016), Trading Gains: new estimates of Swiss GDP, 1851-2008. Economic History Working Papers, 245/2016. London School of Economics and Political Science, Economic History Department, London, UK
  • Chile — 1810–2004: Díaz, J.B. Lüders, R. and Wagner, G. (2007) Economia Chilena 1810 - 2000, Producto total y sectorial una nueva mirada, Pontificia universidad Catolica de Chile, Insituto de Economia, Documeno de Trabajo no. 315
  • China — 1000-1661: Broadberry, S.N., Guan, Hanhui and David Daokui Li (2018), “China, Europe and the Great Divergence: a Study in Historical National Accounting, 980-1850”, Journal of Economic History, 78, 4, 955-1000; 1661–1933: Broadberry, S.N., Guan, Hanhui and David Daokui Li (2018), “China, Europe and the Great Divergence: a Study in Historical National Accounting, 980-1850”, Journal of Economic History, 78, 4, 955-1000; 1661–1933: Xu, Y. Z. Shi, B. van Leeuwen, Y Ni, Z Zhang, and Y Ma, (2016) 'Chinese National Income, ca. 1661-1933', Australian Economic History Review 57(3), 368–393; 1952–2008: Wu, Harry X. (2014), “China’s growth and productivity performance debate revisited – Accounting for China’s sources of growth with a new data set” The Conference Board Economics Program Working Paper Series EWP#14-01.
  • Colombia — 1800 - 1870: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307 (updated data); 1870 - 1923: Bertola, L and Ocampo, J.A. (2012) The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford, Oxford U.P.
  • Czechoslovakia — 1993 -: Based on GDP and population data for their successor states
  • Cuba — 1690–1895: Santamaria Garcia, A. (2005). Las Cuentas nacionales de Cuba, 1960 - 2005', mimeo; 1902–1958: Ward, M. and Devereux, J. (2012), “The Road Not Taken: Pre-Revolutionary Cuban Living Standards in Comparative Perspective” Journal of Economic History, 72(1): 104–132
  • Germany — 1500-1850: Pfister, U. (2022). Economic Growth in Germany, 1500–1850. The Journal of Economic History, 82(4), 1071–1107
  • Ecuador — 1833-1938: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307. (updated data). We use the growth rate between 1933 and 1938 from Prados de la Escosura (2009) and link that to the 1939 level of Maddison’s original estimates.
  • Egypt — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 700 – 1500: Pamuk, Ş. and M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011.; 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Spain — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1270-1850: Álvarez-Nogal, C. and L. Prados de la Escosura (2013). "The Rise and Fall of Spain (1270-1850)," Economic History Review, 66, 1, 1-37, using their annual benchmarks; 1850–2011: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2017), Spanish Economic Growth, 1850-2015 (London: Palgrave Macmillan)
  • Finland — 1600–1860: Eloranta, J., Voutilainen, M. and Nummela, I. (2016). “Estimating Finnish Economic Growth Before 1860” mimeo.
  • France — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1276–1800: Ridolfi, L., & Nuvolari, A. (2021). L’histoire immobile? A reappraisal of French economic growth using the demand-side approach, 1280–1850. European Review of Economic History, 25(3), 405–428
  • United Kingdom — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1252–1700 (England): Broadberry, S.N., B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015), British Economic Growth 1270-1870 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; 1700–1870: Broadberry, S.N., B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015), British Economic Growth 1270-1870 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Ghana — 1885-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Greece — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1833-1913: Kostelenos G., S. Petmezas, D. Vasiliou, E. Kounaris and M. Sfakianakis, (2007), "Gross Domestic Product 1830-1939", Sources of Economic History of Modern Greece: Quantitative data and statistical series 1830-1939, Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece, Athens.
  • Croatia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Indonesia — 1815 – 1880 (Java): Van Zanden (2012). “Economic Growth in Java 1815-1939: The Reconstruction of the Historical National Accounts of a Colonial Economy”, Maddison-Project Working Paper WP-3.; 1880-2008: Van der Eng, P. (2010). The Sources of Long-Term Economic Growth in Indonesia, 1880-2008”, Explorations in Economic History, 47: 294-309
  • India — 1600–1870: Broadberry, S.N., Custodis, J. and Gupta, B. (2015), “India and the great divergence: an Anglo-Indian comparison of GDP per capita, 1600–1871” Explorations in Economic History, 55: 58-75.
  • Iran (Islamic Republic of) — 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Iraq — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 700 – 1500: Pamuk, Ş. and M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011.; 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Iceland — 1870-1945: Jonsson, G. (1998). The gross domestic product of Iceland, 1870-1945. Nordiska Historiska Nasjonalregnkaper, Artikkelsamling from Workshop IV, Solstrand 13-15 NOvember 1998.
  • Israel — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91
  • Italy — 1451-1861: Chilosi, D., & Ciccarelli, C. (2023). Italy in the Great Divergence: What Can We Learn from Engel’s Law (SSRN Scholarly Paper 4514091).; 1861-1871 (North Italy): Malanima, P. (2010), “The long decline of a leading economy: GDP in central and northern Italy, 1300–1913” European Review of Economic History 15 (2): 169–219.; 1871-1990: Baffigi, A. (2011).”Italian National Accounts, 1861-2011”, Banca d’Italia Economic History Working Papers 18.
  • Jamaica — 1850 - 1938: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307 (updated data)
  • Jordan — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Japan — 724-1874: Bassino, Jean-Pascal & Broadberry, Stephen & Fukao, Kyoji & Gupta, Bishnupriya & Takashima, Masanori, (2018). "Japan and the Great Divergence, 730-1874," CEI Working Paper Series 2018-13, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University; 1874-1940: Fukao, K., Bassino, J.-P., Makino, T., Paprzycki, R., Settsu, T., Takashima, M., and Tokui, J. (2015) Regional Inequality and Industrial Structure in Japan: 1874-2008, Tokyo: Maruzen Publishing.
  • Kenya — 1904-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Republic of Korea — 1911-1990: Cha, M.S., Kim, N.N., Park, K.-J., Park, Y. (Eds.) (2020), Historical Statistics of Korea. Studies in Economic History, New York: Springer Publishing
  • Lebanon — 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Liberia — 1845-1950: Gardner, L. (2022). Sovereignty without Power: Liberia in the Age of Empires, 1822-1980. Cambridge University Press.
  • Mexico — 1550–1812: Arroyo Abad, L. and J.L. van Zanden (2016), “Growth under Extractive Institutions? Latin American Per Capita GDP in Colonial Times” Journal of Economic History 76(4): 1182–1215.; 1812–1870: Prados de la Escosura, L., (2009), ‘Lost decades? Economic performance in post-independence Latin America’, Journal of Latin America Studies, 41, pp. 279–307. (updated data); 1870-1895: Bértola, L., & Ocampo, J. A. (2012). The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford University Press, Table A.2; 1895–2003: Barro, R.J. and J.F. Ursua, (2008). “Macroeconomic Crises since 1870” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 255-350
  • TFYR of Macedonia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Montenegro — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Malawi — 1904-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Malaysia — 1900-1939: Nazrin Shah, S. (2017). Charting the Economy: Early 20th Century Malaya and Contemporary Malaysian Contrasts, Oxford University Press
  • Nigeria — 1885-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Netherlands — 1348–1807 (Holland): Van Zanden, J. L. and van Leeuwen, B. (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49 (2012), pp. 119–30.; 1807-1913: Smits, J.P., E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000). The Measurement of Gross National Product and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre Monograph series no 5).
  • Norway — 1820–1930: Grytten, O.H. (2015). Norwegian gross domestic product by industry 1830 - 1930, Norges Bank Working paper 19/2015. Population from Maddison (2006)
  • Panama — 1906–1945: De Corso, G. (2013). El crecimiento economico de Venuzuela, Desde la Oligarquia Conservadora Hasta La Revolucion Bolivariana: 1830-2012. Uno Vision cuantitativa *: Venezuelan Economic Growth From The Conservative Oligarchy To The Bolivarian Revolution (1830-2012), Revista De Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 31(3), 321-357. doi:10.1017/S0212610913000190
  • Peru — 1600–1812: Arroyo Abad, L. and J.L. van Zanden (2016), “Growth under Extractive Institutions? Latin American Per Capita GDP in Colonial Times” Journal of Economic History 76(4): 1182–1215.; 1812–1870: Seminario, B. (2015). El Desarrallo de la Economía Peruana en la Era Moderna, Universidad de Pacifico, Lima; 1870-1901: Bertola, L and Ocampo, J.A. (2012) The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford, Oxford U.P, Table A2
  • Poland — 1409–1913: Malinowski, M. and Van Zanden (2017), “National income and its distribution in preindustrial Poland in a global perspective” Cliometrica, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 375–40
  • D.P.R. of Korea — 1911-1940: Cha, M.S., Kim, N.N., Park, K.-J., Park, Y. (Eds.) (2020), Historical Statistics of Korea. Studies in Economic History, New York: Springer Publishing.; 1990-2011: Cha, M.S., Kim, N.N., Park, K.-J., Park, Y. (Eds.) (2020), Historical Statistics of Korea. Studies in Economic History, New York: Springer Publishing.
  • Portugal — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1530–1850: Palma, N., & Reis, J. (2019). From Convergence to Divergence: Portuguese Economic Growth, 1527–1850. The Journal of Economic History, 79(2), 477-506. doi:10.1017/S0022050719000056
  • Romania — 1862–1995: Axenciuc, V. (2012). Produsul intern brut al Romaniei, Vol. 1, Institutl de Economie Nationala, Bucarest; 1915-1919 & 1949: Voinea, L., Cojocaru, A., Costache, B., Grigoraș, V., Lovin, H., Neagu, C., Orțan, D., & Tănase, A. (2019). One Hundred Years of Honesty: Recovering the Lost Memory of the Romanian Economy 1918-2018.
  • Russia — 1860-1885: Kuboniwa, M. (2019). Estimating GDP and Foreign Rents of the Oil and Gas Sector in the Soviet Union and Present-Day Russia. In M. Kuboniwa, Y. Nakamura, K. Kumo, & Y. Shida (Eds.), Russian Economic Development over Three Centuries: New Data and Inferences (pp. 421–438). Springer.
  • Saudi Arabia — 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Singapore — 1900–1959: Sugimoto, I. (2011), Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations, Economic Growth Centre Research Monograph ser., 2, http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/7858.html (accessed on 30 Jan. 2013).
  • Serbia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Former USSR — 1860-1885: Kuboniwa, M. (2019). Estimating GDP and Foreign Rents of the Oil and Gas Sector in the Soviet Union and Present-Day Russia. In M. Kuboniwa, Y. Nakamura, K. Kumo, & Y. Shida (Eds.), Russian Economic Development over Three Centuries: New Data and Inferences (pp. 421–438). Springer.; 1885-1913: Gregory, P. R. (1982). Russian National Income, 1885–1913, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1913-1928: Markevich, A. and M. Harrison (2011). “Great War, Civil War, and Recovery: Russia's National Income, 1913 to 1928”, The Journal of Economic History, Volume 71 (3): 672 – 703, table 6.; 1991 -: Based on GDP and population data for their successor states
  • Slovenia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Sweden — 1300–1560: Krantz, O. (2017) “Swedish GDP 1300-1560 A Tentative Estimate” Lund Papers in Economic History: General Issues; No. 152.; 1560–1950: Schön, L., and O. Krantz (2015) “New Swedish Historical National Accounts since the 16th Century in Constant and Current Prices” Lund Papers in Economic History no. 140
  • Syrian Arab Republic — 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Turkey — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 700 - 1820: Pamuk, Ş. and M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011; Milanovic, B. (2006), “An estimate of average income and inequality in Byzantium around year 1000,” Review of Income and Wealth 52 (3).; 1500-1820: Pamuk, S. (2009). “Estimating GDP per capita for the Ottoman Empire in a European Comparative Framework, 1500-1820”, paper presented at the XVth World Economic History Congress, August 2009, Utrecht
  • Taiwan, Province of China — 1820 - 1940: Fukao, K., D. Ma and T. Yuan (2007). Real GDP in Pre-War East Asia: A 1934-36 Benchmark Purchasing Power Parity Comparison with the U.S. Review of Income and Wealth, 53 (3): 503 - 537. Trend from original Maddison estimates applied to benchmark for 1934/36
  • Uganda — 1906-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Uruguay — 1800-1870: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307. (updated data); 1870–2014: Bèrtola, L. (2016). El PIB per Capita de Uruguay 1870 - 2016: una reconstruccion. PHES working paper No 48
  • United States — 1650 - 1790: McCusker, John J., ‘Colonial Statistics’, Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Time to the Present, in S. B. Carter, S. S. Gartner, M. R. Haineset al. New York, Cambridge University Press. V-671.; 1790 - 1870: Sutch, R. (2006). National Income and Product. Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Time to the Present, in S. B. Carter, S. S. Gartner, M. R. Haineset al. New York, Cambridge University Press III-23-25.; 1800-1830: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307. (updated data)
  • Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) — 1830–2012: De Corso, G. (2013). El crecimiento economico de Venuzuela, Desde la Oligarquia Conservadora Hasta La Revolucion Bolivariana: 1830-2012. Uno Vision cuantitativa *: Venezuelan Economic Growth From The Conservative Oligarchy To The Bolivarian Revolution (1830-2012), Revista De Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 31(3), 321-357. doi:10.1017/S0212610913000190
  • Former Yugoslavia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project; 2008 -: Based on GDP and population data for their successor states
  • South Africa — 1700–1900 (Cape Colony): Fourie, J. and Van Zanden, J.L. (2013). GDP in the Dutch Cape Colony: the Nationals Accounts of a Slave-Based Society, South African Journal of Economics, vol. 81 (4): 467 - 490
  • Zambia — 1906-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Zimbabwe — 1914-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.

Angus Maddison's original sources (2010)

  • Argentina — 1900-1913: Unpublished annual estimates supplied by ECLA/CONADE. and quinquennial averages published in El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina, ECLA, Mexico, 1959, p. 15;; 1913-1950: IEERAL, "Estadísticas de la evolución económica de Argentina, 1913-84", Estudios, Buenos Aires, July-September, 1986.
  • Australia — 1820-1828: Butlin, N.G. 'Our 200 Years', Queesland Calendar, 1988; 1828-1860: N.G. Butlin, "Contours of the Australian Economy 1788-1860", Australian Economic Review, Sept. 1986, pp. 112-13;; 1861-1938/9: N.G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1938/9, Cambridge, 1962,pp.460-1; amdended as indicated in N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-19000, Cambridge, 1964, p. 453 and with revised deflator shown in M.W. Butlin, A Preliminary Annual Databae 1900/1901 to 1973/1974, Discussion Paper 7701, Reserve Bank of Australia, 1977, p. 41; 1938/9-1950: from expenditure aggregates in 1966/7 prices in M.W. Butlin, RS/FLW/, p.85.
  • Austria — 1830-1913: Kausel, "Oster-reichs Volkseinkommen 1830 bis 1913" in Geschichte und Ergebnisse der zentralen amtlichen Statistik in Österreich 1829-1979, Beitrage zur österreichischen Statistik, Heft 550, Vienna, 1979, pp. 692-3.; 1913-50: A. Kausel, N. Nemeth, and H. Seidel, "Oster-reichs Volkseinkommen, 1913-63", Monatsberichte des Osterreichischen Institutes für Wirtschaftsforschung, 14th Sonderheft, Vienna, August 1965, p. 38 and 42;
  • Belgium — 1846-1913: J. Gadisseur, "Contribution à l'étude de la production agricole en Belgique de 1846 à 1913", Revue belge d'histoire contemporaine, vol. IV, 1-2, 1973,; 1913-1950: C. Carbonnelle, "Recherches sur levolution de la production en Belgique de 1900à 1957", Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, no. 3, April 1959, p. 358.
  • Bangladesh — 1900-1950: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995
  • Brazil — 1900-1950: A. Maddison and Associates, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Brazil and Mexico, Oxford University Press, New York 1992;
  • Canada — 1820-1850: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1851-70: O.J. Firestone, "Canada's Changing Economy in the Second Half of the 19th Century", NBER, New York, 1957, processed, amended for 1820–70 to include income of the indigenous population (taken to be $400 per capita in 1820 and 1870); 1870-1926: M.C. Urquart and Associates, ed., Gross National Product, Canada 1870-1926: The Derivation of the Estimates, McGill Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1993, pp. 11-12 and 24-5,; 1926-1950: Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts, vol. 1, The Annual Estimates 1926-1974, Ottawa, 1975, p. 323. 1960 onwards from OECD, National Accounts.
  • Colombia — 1929 - 1950: CEPAL, Series Historicas del Crecimiento de America Latina, Santiago, 1978
  • Czechoslovakia — 1820-1913: A. Kausel, "Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1830 bis 1913", in "Geschichte und Ergebnisse der zentralen amtlichen Statistik in Österreich 1829-1979", Beiträge zum Osterreichischen Statistik, 550, Vienna, 1979.; 1913-37: F.L. Pryor, Z.P. Pryor, M. Stadnik, and G.J. Staller "Czechoslovakia Aggregate Production in the Inter-war Period", Review of Income and Wealth, March 1971, p.36.; 1937-50: G. Lazarcik, "Czechoslovak Gross National Product by Sector of Origin and Final Use, 1937, and 1948-65"", Occasional Paper 26, Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, New York, 1969.
  • Denmark — 1820-1947: S.A. Hansen, Okonomisk vaekst i Danmark, vol. II, Institute of Economic History, Copenhagen, 1974, pp. 229-32; 1947-50: Soren Larsen, "Reviderede tidsserier for produktionsvaerdi og bruttofaktorindkomst for perioden 1947- 65", CBS, Copenhagen, 1992, mimeographed.
  • Germany — 1850-1950: Hoffmann, Grumbach and Hesse, op. cit., pp. 454-5.
  • Finland — 1860-1960: R. Hjerppe, The Finnish Economy 1860-1985: Growth and Structural Change, Bank of Finland, Helsinki, 1989, pp. 198-200.
  • France — 1850-1913: Toutain, Le Produit interieur de la France de 1789 a 1982, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1987; 1920-1950: Toutain, Le Produit interieur de la France de 1789 a 1982, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1987
  • United Kingdom — 1870-1950: C.H. Feinstein, National Income Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965, Cambridge, 1972
  • Greece — 1913-1929: C. Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, 3rd edition, Macmillan, London, 1957; 1929-38 GNP at factor cost from Ekonomikos Tachydromos, 22 May 1954; 1938-50 from OEEC, Europe and the World Economy, Paris 1960, p.116.; 1929-1950: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995
  • Hungary — 1870-1913: L. Katus, "Economic Growth in Hungary during the Age of Dualism (1867-1913)" in E. Pemlenyi, ed., Social Economic Research in the History of East Central Europe, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1970, p.108 and J. Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, Princeton, 1983, pp. 291-3; 1900-42: A. Eckstein, "National Income and Capital Formation in Hungary, 1900-50", in S. Kuznets, ed., Income and Wealth, series V GNP index, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1955, p. 175; 1938-50: from L. Czirjak, "Hungarian GNP by Sectors of Origin of Product and End Uses, 1938 and 1946-67", Occasional Paper 43, Research Project on East Central Europe, New York, 1973.
  • India — 1870-1900: A. Heston, "National Income", in D. Kumar and M. Desai, Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 2, Cambridge, 1983, p. 397.; 1900-46: A. Maddison, "Alternative Estimates of the Real Product of India, 1900-46", Indian Economic and Social History Review, 22, 2, 1985.; 1946-50: A. Maddison, Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan Since the Moghuls, Allen and Unwin, London, 1971, p. 169.
  • Ireland — 1820, 1870, 1913: MPD 2013, Bolt and Van Zanden, 2014, The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts. The Economic History Review, 67(3), 627–651; 1913-1926: P. Deane (1968), and Feinstein, 1972; 1926-1950: K.A. Kennedy, Productivity and Industrial Growth: The Irish Experience, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 3.
  • Republic of Korea — 1820, 1870: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995
  • Myanmar — 1901-1938: "Trends of Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Burma 1870-1940", Journal of the Burma Research Society, 1964, p. 144; 1938-1950: E.E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, Dorsey, Homewood, Illinois, 1962, Table 18-1,
  • Netherlands — 1913-1950: C.A. van Bochove and T.A. Huitker, "Main National Accounting Series, 1900-1986", CBS Occasional Paper, No. 17, The Hague, 1987.
  • Norway — 1930-1950: Central Bureau of Statistics Norway, 1970 and Maddison, A. Monintoring the World Economy, 1995
  • New Zealand: — 1870-1939: K. Rankin, "New Zealand's Gross National Product: 1859-1939, Review of Income and Wealth, March 1992, pp. 60-1., 1870 amended to include indigenous population (taken to be $400 per capita); 1939-50: C. Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, third edition, Macmillan, London, 1957, pp. 171-2
  • Peru — 1900-1913: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1913-1941: C.A. Bolona Behr, "Tariff Policies in Peru, 1880-1980", Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1981;; 1942-1950: "Cuadros del producto interno bruto en dollares de 1950", CEPAL, Santiago, October 1962, mimeographed;; 1945-1950: Series Historicas del Crecimiento de America Latina, CEPAL, Santiago, 1978.
  • Philippines — 1820-1900: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1900-1950: R.W. Hooley, "Long Term Growth of the Philippine Economy, 1902-1961", , The Philippine Economic Journal, First Semester, 1968.
  • Poland — 1913-1929: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1929-1938: K. Laski, Akumulacja i spozycie w procesie uprzemyslowienia Polski Ludowej, Ksiazka i Wiedza, Warsaw, 1956, pp. 86-90; 1937-1950: T.P. Alton (1970), p. 46,
  • Portugal — 1850-1913: Pedro Lains, "How Far Can We Go? Measuring Portuguese Economic Growth (1850-1913)"; 1938-1950: R. Janes Cartado and N.E. Sequeira da Rosa, Series Longas as Contas Nacionais Portuguesas 1958-1985, Banco de Portugal, Lisbon,
  • Former USSR — 1928-40: R. Moorsteen and R.P. Powell, The Soviet Capital Stock 1928-1962, Irwin, Illinois, 1966, p. 361; 1945-50: R. Moorsteen and R.P. Powell, The Soviet Capital Stock 1928-1962, Irwin, Illinois, 1966, p. 362; 1950-90: CIA
  • Thailand — 1820-1900: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1900-50: Sompop Manarungsan, "Economic Development of Thailand, 1850-1950", University of Groningen, Ph. D. thesis, 1989
  • Turkey — 182, 1870: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1923-48: T. Bulutay, Y.S. Tezel and N. Yielderim, Turkiye Milli Geliri 1923-1948, Ankara, 1974.
  • United States — 1820-1950: GDP movement from Maddison (1995a), amended for 1820–70 to include income of the indigenous population (taken to be $400 per capita in 1820 and 1870).
  • Former Yugoslavia — 1870-1909: Maddison, A. The World Economy, a Millenial Perspective, OECD, 2001; 1909-12: I. Vinski, "National Product and Fixed Assets in the Territory of Yugoslavia 1900-59" , in P. Deane, ed., Income and Wealth, Series IX, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1961, p. 221; 1920-39: I. Vinski, "National Product and Fixed Assets in the Territory of Yugoslavia 1900-59" , in P. Deane, ed., Income and Wealth, Series IX, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1961, p. 222; 1947-52: I. Vinski, "National Product and Fixed Assets in the Territory of Yugoslavia 1900-59" , in P. Deane, ed., Income and Wealth, Series IX, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1961, p. 223

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