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Democracy and economic growth: is there a link?

Since 1950, economies that were democracies for a whole decade raised GDP per person by a median 2.2% a year; those that were non-democracies for a whole decade, by 2.0%. The averages are close. The spread is not: non-democracies account for 11 of the 15 fastest decades and 15 of the 15 worst.

Maddison Project 2023 and Boix–Miller–Rosato 4.0 · data to 202018 min read

Typical growth a year per person, 1950–2020
2.2% vs 2.0%

median country-decade: democracies vs non-democracies (301 and 386 decades)

Spread of decade growth
×2.0

standard deviation: 3.6 points for non-democracies, 1.8 for democracies

The 15 fastest country-decades
11 of 15

spent under non-democracy for the whole decade; such decades were 48% of all

The 15 worst country-decades
15 of 15

spent under non-democracy for the whole decade; at the very bottom, income per person fell 11.7% a year

Chance a democracy breaks down in a year
8.2% → 0.1%

below $2,000 a person vs above $20,000 (1 breakdown in 1,112 country-years), 1950–2020

How the comparison works

Two published datasets, joined country by country and year by year. Regimes come from the Boix–Miller–Rosato coding (version 4.0), which marks every sovereign country in every year from 1800 to 2020 as a democracy or not. A country-year counts as a democracy when all three conditions hold:

  1. the executive is elected, directly or indirectly, in popular elections and answers either to voters or to a legislature;
  2. the legislature (or a directly elected executive) is chosen in free and fair elections;
  3. a majority of adult men has the right to vote.

Income is GDP per person from the Maddison Project (2023 release), in 2011 international dollars: already adjusted for inflation and for price differences between countries. The unit of comparison is a country-decade: growth from 1950 to 1960, and so on up to 2010–2020. A decade belongs to a democracy when the country was coded a democracy in all ten of its years, to a non-democracy when it was coded so in all ten, and is “changed” otherwise. Economies with fewer than 1 million people at the start are left out. That leaves 811 country-decades from 152 economies: 301 democratic, 386 non-democratic and 124 with a change of regime.

“Non-democracy” is the dataset's own category; everyday speech calls most such regimes autocracies or authoritarian. The coding is a minimal, two-way record of how leaders are chosen, not a score of how well anyone governed. This article reports it as published and takes no view on any government, past or present.

On average, the two groups grew at similar rates

Over 301 democratic decades the median growth of GDP per person was 2.2% a year and the mean 2.4%; over 386 non-democratic decades, 2.0% and 2.0%. The median is higher for democracies. The difference in means, 0.3 points a year in favour of democracies, is smaller than its statistical margin of error (±0.4 points): on this simple comparison the two groups cannot be told apart.

The spread is where they differ. The middle half of democratic decades grew between +1.2% and +3.3% a year; the middle half of non-democratic ones between +0.2% and +3.9%. The weakest tenth of non-democratic decades lost more than 1.7% of income per person a year; the weakest tenth of democratic ones grew by less than +0.5% a year. The standard deviation, the usual yardstick of spread, is 3.6 points for non-democracies and 1.8 for democracies: ×2.0.

DemocracyNon-democracyChanged during the decade
Each dot is one country-decade: growth of GDP per person a year, in 2011 dollars. Box: the middle half; whiskers: the 10th to the 90th percentile; line: the median. Economies with at least 1 million people. Data: Maddison Project Database 2023 (Bolt and van Zanden), CC BY 4.0 · original sources · calculations: BigCapital Regimes: Boix–Miller–Rosato coding of democracy, version 4.0 (CC0 1.0)
Regime over the decadeDecadesMedian a yearMean10th … 90th percentileStd. dev., points6% a year or moreIncome fell
Democracy301+2.2%+2.4%+0.5% … +4.4%1.83%6%
Non-democracy386+2.0%+2.0%−1.7% … +6.3%3.611%23%
Changed during the decade124+1.8%+1.6%−1.5% … +4.2%2.54%25%

Year by year the pattern is the same. Across 8,331 country-years without a change of regime, GDP per person fell by more than 5% in 8.5% of non-democratic years and 4.2% of democratic ones, and rose by more than 10% in 6.5% and 2.1%. The standard deviation of yearly growth: 7.0 points against 4.0.

The fastest and the worst decades come mostly from one group

Rank all 811 country-decades by growth. Of the 15 fastest, 11 were spent under non-democracy, 3 under democracy and 1 with a change of regime. Of the 15 worst: 15 under non-democracy, all of them. Non-democracies were 48% of all the decades, so they turn up at both ends more often than their share alone would suggest.

Decades at a miracle pace, 6% a year or more (the bar of our economic-miracles article): 43 of 386 non-democratic (11%) and 8 of 301 democratic (3%). Decades in which income per person fell: 90 non-democratic (23%) and 19 democratic (6%). The full range runs from −11.7% to +17.4% a year under non-democracy and from −3.3% to +10.3% under democracy.

DemocracyNon-democracyChanged during the decade
Growth of GDP per person a year over each decade; colour: the regime coding over the decade. Economies with at least 1 million people, 1950–2020. Data: Maddison Project Database 2023 (Bolt and van Zanden), CC BY 4.0 · original sources · calculations: BigCapital Regimes: Boix–Miller–Rosato coding of democracy, version 4.0 (CC0 1.0)
The 15 fastest and the 15 worst decades as tables
The 15 fastest
#EconomyYearsA yearRegime coding
1Libya1960–1970+17.4% Non-democracy
2Azerbaijan2000–2010+14.4% Non-democracy
3Angola2000–2010+14.1% Non-democracy
4Kuwait1990–2000+13.9% Non-democracy
5Turkmenistan2000–2010+13.2% Non-democracy
6Afghanistan2000–2010+12.5% Non-democracy
7Libya2000–2010+11.6% Non-democracy
8Iraq2000–2010+10.9% Non-democracy
9Mongolia2000–2010+10.3% Democracy
10Japan1960–1970+9.3% Democracy
11Chad2000–2010+9.2% Non-democracy
12Lebanon1990–2000+9.1% Non-democracy
13Oman1990–2000+8.9% Non-democracy
14Romania2000–2010+8.7% Democracy
15South Korea1980–1990+8.6% Changed during the decade
The 15 worst
#EconomyYearsA yearRegime coding
1Venezuela2010–2020−11.7% Non-democracy
2Iraq1980–1990−9.1% Non-democracy
3Libya2010–2020−8.7% Non-democracy
4Liberia1980–1990−8.6% Non-democracy
5Yemen2010–2020−8.3% Non-democracy
6Syria2010–2020−7.8% Non-democracy
7Kuwait1980–1990−7.4% Non-democracy
8United Arab Emirates1980–1990−6.6% Non-democracy
9Sierra Leone1990–2000−6.6% Non-democracy
10DR Congo1990–2000−6.5% Non-democracy
11Afghanistan1990–2000−6.3% Non-democracy
12Libya1980–1990−5.6% Non-democracy
13Liberia1990–2000−5.4% Non-democracy
14Zimbabwe2000–2010−4.5% Non-democracy
15Côte d’Ivoire1980–1990−4.4% Non-democracy

Many entries at both ends are oil economies, wars and rebounds from wars: forces that move income whatever the regime. Researchers have found the same shape: Almeida and Ferreira (2002) report that the best and the worst growth performers are both more likely to be autocracies.

The gap changes sign from decade to decade

Split by decade, the medians trade places: democracies grew faster in 4 of the 7 decades (1960–1970, 1970–1980, 1980–1990 and 1990–2000), non-democracies in 3 (1950–1960, 2000–2010 and 2010–2020). The widest gap: 1980–1990, 2.0 points a year in favour of democracies.

Democracies also started richer: the median democratic decade began at $13,209 a person, the median non-democratic one at $2,558. Richer economies usually grow more slowly, because they cannot catch up by copying what already works elsewhere, so the raw comparison is tilted. Comparing like with like, within three income bands of equal size: below $2,500, 1.8% vs 1.2% (26 and 192 decades); $2,500–$8,700, 3.2% vs 3.1% (77 and 140 decades); above $8,700, 2.1% vs 1.4% (198 and 54 decades). The democratic median was higher in all 3 bands.

DemocracyNon-democracy
Median growth of GDP per person a year, country-decades coded democracy or non-democracy in all ten years. Income bands: thirds of all the decades by GDP per person at the start, in 2011 dollars. Data: Maddison Project Database 2023 (Bolt and van Zanden), CC BY 4.0 · original sources · calculations: BigCapital Regimes: Boix–Miller–Rosato coding of democracy, version 4.0 (CC0 1.0)
Medians by decade, as a table
YearsDemocracyNon-democracy
1950–1960+2.4% 25+2.8% 31
1960–1970+3.5% 26+2.4% 55
1970–1980+2.7% 24+2.3% 69
1980–1990+1.8% 29−0.2% 66
1990–2000+2.4% 52+1.7% 52
2000–2010+2.7% 70+4.4% 57
2010–2020+1.2% 75+1.3% 56

After each median: the number of country-decades in the group.

What happens to income when a regime changes

Between 1961 and 2001, 63 transitions to democracy and 41 breakdowns of democracy have income data from 10 years before to 20 years after (economies with at least 1 million people). The chart follows GDP per person against the average economy in the same years, so a worldwide boom or slump does not count, and sets it to zero in the year before the change.

Transitions to democracy. Over the 10 years before, these countries kept pace with the average economy; over the last 5 years, they fell 2.5% behind the average economy, within the margin of error. Their lowest point came 5 years after the change: −3.2% (95% range −8.3% to +2.1%), within the margin of error. 20 years after, they stood at −1.1% (−10.6% to +9.3%), within the margin of error. 33 of the 63 were still coded democracies 20 years on, or in 2020.

Breakdowns of democracy. Over the 10 years before, these countries fell 6.3% behind the average economy, outside the margin of error; over the last 5 years, they fell 2.7% behind the average economy, within the margin of error. The lowest point came 1 year after the change: −4.8% (−7.3% to −2.3%), outside the margin of error. 20 years after: +5.7% (−5.3% to +18.0%), within the margin of error.

Transition to democracyBreakdown of democracy95% range
GDP per person against the average economy of the sample, compared with the year before the change (0). Line: the average of the events; shading: the 95% range. Changes as coded by Boix, Miller and Rosato; 10 years before to 20 after. Data: Maddison Project Database 2023 (Bolt and van Zanden), CC BY 4.0 · original sources · calculations: BigCapital Regimes: Boix–Miller–Rosato coding of democracy, version 4.0 (CC0 1.0)
The numbers behind the chart
YearTransition to democracyBreakdown of democracy
Year −10+0.3%−5.3% … +6.3%+6.7%+0.5% … +13.3%
Year −5+2.6%−0.9% … +6.3%+2.8%−0.7% … +6.4%
Year −100
Year 0−0.8%−2.0% … +0.3%−4.2%−8.3% … +0.1%
Year +1−0.7%−2.6% … +1.3%−4.8%−7.3% … −2.3%
Year +2−0.3%−2.8% … +2.2%−4.5%−7.9% … −1.0%
Year +5−3.2%−8.3% … +2.1%−2.0%−6.7% … +3.0%
Year +10−1.2%−7.5% … +5.5%−0.5%−7.1% … +6.5%
Year +15+1.4%−6.4% … +10.0%+1.5%−7.7% … +11.5%
Year +20−1.1%−10.6% … +9.3%+5.7%−5.3% … +18.0%

Change of GDP per person against the average economy since the year before the change; small text: the 95% range. 63 transitions and 41 breakdowns.

On average, changes of both kinds came after years of falling behind the average economy, although for transitions to democracy the dip is within the margin of error: growth can shape regimes, not only the other way round. Careful studies do more than average. Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2019) model each country’s own growth path, including the dip they find before democratizations, and estimate that “democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run.” A plain average like the one above is not built to separate cause from effect, and its wide ranges show how different the cases are.

Richer countries are more often democracies

Turn the question around. Across all country-years from 1950 to 2020, the share coded as democracies rises with income: 15% below $2,000 a person, up to 87% at $20,000–$40,000, and 68% above $40,000. In 2020, 37 of the 48 economies above $20,000 a person were democracies, and 6 of the 21 below $2,000. Over the period the count of democracies grew from 29 of 68 economies in 1950 to 84 of 150 in 2020.

DemocracyNon-democracy
Each square is an economy with at least 1 million people, placed by GDP per person in 2011 dollars and coloured by its coding that year; above each column, the democracies in it. Data: Maddison Project Database 2023 (Bolt and van Zanden), CC BY 4.0 · original sources · calculations: BigCapital Regimes: Boix–Miller–Rosato coding of democracy, version 4.0 (CC0 1.0)

The link runs mostly through survival. A democracy below $2,000 a person broke down in 8.2% of its years (26 times in 318 country-years); one above $20,000, in 0.1% (1 breakdown in 1,112 country-years). The yearly chance that a non-democracy became a democracy stayed within a narrower range: from 0% to 3.7% across the bands, against 0% to 8.2% for breakdowns. Przeworski and co-authors (2000) described this pattern: democracies appear at many levels of income but last far more often in rich countries.

A democracy breaks downA non-democracy becomes a democracy
Yearly chance, by GDP per person in the first year (2011 dollars), that a democracy is coded a non-democracy the next year, or a non-democracy a democracy. Country-years 1950–2020, economies with at least 1 million people. Data: Maddison Project Database 2023 (Bolt and van Zanden), CC BY 4.0 · original sources · calculations: BigCapital Regimes: Boix–Miller–Rosato coding of democracy, version 4.0 (CC0 1.0)
GDP per personShare democraticBreakdowns a yearTransitions a year
below $2,00015%8.2%26 / 3181.6%30 / 1,849
$2,000–$5,00029%4.2%23 / 5452.2%30 / 1,347
$5,000–$10,00044%2.0%15 / 7422.7%25 / 938
$10,000–$20,00070%0.5%5 / 1,0003.7%16 / 430
$20,000–$40,00087%0.1%1 / 9140.8%1 / 130
above $40,00068%0%0 / 1980%0 / 93

Whether income causes democracy is itself disputed. Lipset (1959) proposed that economic development supports democracy. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008) found that the statistical link disappears when each country is compared with itself over time. Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), who built the coding used here, find that the correlation between economic modernization and democracy has weakened over time.

What the research finds

Decades of studies, with different data and methods, reach different answers. In brief, in order of publication:

  1. 1959

    Income → democracyDevelopment supports democracy

    Lipset (1959), “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, American Political Science Review 53(1): 69–105. The modernization idea: richer, more educated societies are more likely to sustain democracy.

  2. 1996

    Democracy → growthWeakly negative

    Barro (1996), “Democracy and Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth 1(1): 1–27. About 100 countries, 1960–1990: with the rule of law, free markets, government consumption and education held equal, democracy's overall effect on growth is small and slightly negative, with a hint of a curve: more political freedom helps growth at low levels and slows it once a moderate level is reached.

  3. 2000

    Democracy → growthNo difference in total income

    Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990, Cambridge University Press. Regime type made no difference to the growth of total income; income per person grew faster in democracies because population grew faster under dictatorships; democracies were far more likely to survive in richer countries.

  4. 2002

    Stability of growthHigher under autocracy

    Almeida and Ferreira (2002), “Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance”, Economics & Politics 14(3): 225–257. Growth varies more under autocracy, both across and within countries; the best and the worst performers are both more likely to be autocracies.

  5. 2008

    Income → democracyThe link vanishes within countries

    Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008), “Income and Democracy”, American Economic Review 98(3): 808–842. With country fixed effects, each country compared with itself, the statistical link from income to democracy disappears.

  6. 2008

    Democracy → growthNo direct effect, positive indirect

    Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008), “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis”, American Journal of Political Science 52(1): 61–83. Pooling 483 estimates from 84 studies: no direct effect of democracy on growth, but positive indirect effects through more human capital, lower inflation, more political stability and more economic freedom.

  7. 2013

    Income → democracyThe link weakens over time

    Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), “A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800–2007”, Comparative Political Studies 46(12): 1523–1554. The coding used on this page; the authors also find that economic modernization has become less correlated with democracy over time.

  8. 2019

    Democracy → growthAbout +20% in the long run

    Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2019), “Democracy Does Cause Growth”, Journal of Political Economy 127(1): 47–100. A dynamic panel with a consolidated democracy indicator: democratizations raise GDP per person by about a fifth in the long run, through more investment, schooling and health, with similar effects at different levels of development.

  9. 2022

    MeasurementAutocracies overstate growth

    Martinez (2022), “How Much Should We Trust the Dictator's GDP Growth Estimates?”, Journal of Political Economy 130(10): 2731–2769. Comparing reported GDP with night-time lights seen from satellites, it estimates that autocracies overstate yearly GDP growth by roughly a third (about 35%).

Why the data cannot crown a winner

A comparison of averages describes; it does not prove. Six reasons to read the numbers above with care:

  • Cause runs both ways. Economic trouble can topple governments (breakdowns above came, on average, after the countries had fallen behind), so regime and growth move together for reasons that run in both directions.
  • The groups start in different places. The median democratic decade began at $13,209 a person, the median non-democratic one at $2,558; richer economies tend to grow more slowly, poorer ones have more room to catch up.
  • Other forces. Oil and other natural resources, wars, geography, education and trade all move growth, and several of them also shape regimes.
  • Measurement. Reported GDP may be overstated in autocracies (Martinez 2022), which would flatter their averages. A two-way coding cannot tell a one-party state from a monarchy or military rule, nor a new democracy from an old one.
  • Who changes group. Decades with a change of regime sit in a third group (124 decades, median 1.8% a year), and collapses often bring a change of regime, so some of the worst outcomes of both kinds of regime are filed there.
  • The sample moves. Democracies were 29 of 68 economies in 1950 and 84 of 150 in 2020, so the democratic group leans towards later decades, when the world economy grew at different rates.

Questions people ask

Do democracies grow faster than autocracies?

On a plain comparison of averages, by little or nothing. Since 1950, the median democratic decade grew 2.2% a year per person and the median non-democratic one 2.0%; the means were 2.4% and 2.0%. The difference in means, 0.3 points a year in favour of democracies, is smaller than its statistical margin of error (±0.4 points): on this simple comparison the two groups cannot be told apart. Studies with stronger methods reach different conclusions: Barro (1996) found a small negative effect, a meta-analysis of 84 studies found no direct effect (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 2008), and Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2019) estimate a long-run gain of about 20% in GDP per person after democratization.

Can authoritarian countries grow fast?

Yes, and they can also shrink fast. Of the 15 fastest country-decades since 1950, 11 were spent under non-democracy for the whole decade; so were 15 of the 15 worst. 43 non-democratic decades grew at 6% a year or more, against 8 democratic ones; 90 non-democratic decades ended poorer than they began, against 19 democratic ones. In this data non-democracy goes with a wider range of outcomes, not a higher average. The democracies among the 15 fastest: Mongolia (2000–2010, +10.3%), Japan (1960–1970, +9.3%) and Romania (2000–2010, +8.7%).

Does democracy cause growth, or does growth cause democracy?

Both directions are studied, and the evidence is contested. Richer countries are more often democracies (15% of country-years below $2,000 a person, 87% at $20,000–$40,000), and democracies rarely break down once rich (0.1% a year above $20,000). Lipset (1959) saw development as a support of democracy; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008) found the link vanishes when countries are compared with themselves over time; Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2019) find the other arrow, democracy raising growth. The averages on this page cannot settle it.

Which political system is best for the economy?

The data cannot crown one. Average growth is close; growth under non-democracy has been far more dispersed, with more miracles and more collapses; and studies disagree on cause and effect. What the evidence does show: extremes are rarer under democracy (a standard deviation of 1.8 points against 3.6 for decade growth), democracies are far more durable in rich countries, and growth figures reported by autocracies may be overstated. Growth is also only one of the things people ask of a political system.

Go deeper

The world economy in 2,000 yearsIncome per person since year 1, and the Great Divergence Economic miraclesThe economies that got rich fastest, by one rule GDP per person by countryEvery country, the latest figures HyperinflationWhen prices run away and money stops working

How the numbers are calculated

  • Regimes: Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy, 1800–2020, version 4.0, by Michael Miller, Carles Boix and Sebastian Rosato, Harvard Dataverse, dedicated to the public domain (CC0 1.0). Citation: Carles Boix, Michael K. Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. 2013. "A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007." Comparative Political Studies 46(12): 1523-54. doi:10.1177/0010414012463905. We use its main variable, democracy; the groups, rates and ranges are BigCapital's calculations.
  • Income: Maddison Project Database, version 2023, by Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen), licensed under CC BY 4.0. Citation: MPD version 2023: Bolt, Jutta and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024). Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update. Journal of Economic Surveys, 1–41, doi:10.1111/joes.12618; see also the original sources of the estimates.
  • Decades: growth of GDP per person from the first year to the tenth after, as a compound rate a year; the regime of a decade from the coding of its ten growth years. Economies with at least 1 million people at the start. Medians and percentiles over country-decades. The margin of error of the difference in means is 1.96 standard errors, treating decades as independent; they are not quite, so if anything it is too narrow.
  • Transitions and breakdowns: the years in which the coding switches from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0, 1961–2001, with income data from 10 years before to 20 after. Each year's growth minus the average growth of all the economies in the sample that year (in logarithms, each economy weighted equally), summed from the year before the change and averaged over the events. 95% range: the mean ± 1.96 standard errors across events. Changes reversed later stay in.
  • Income bands: GDP per person in 2011 international dollars. Breakdown and transition rates: the share of democratic (non-democratic) country-years followed by a non-democratic (democratic) year, by income in the first of the two years.
  • The USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia count as single economies until they split up, their successor states after; decades and windows that straddle a split are left out. West and East Germany, North and South Vietnam, and North and South Yemen are coded separately in the regime data while the income data cover today's countries, so those years are left out. The regime data end in 2020, the income data in 2022.
  • Regimes are classified only by the published coding. The article names no leaders or parties and makes no judgement about any government, past or present.
  • Economic history, not a forecast and not investment advice.
Original sources of the income estimates

The Maddison Project asks that all original papers be cited when its data is shown in charts. Here they are, as the database lists them: first the sources added since 2013, then Angus Maddison's own (2010).

Sources added since 2013

  • GDP pc: 2008 - 2022: Total Economy Database the Conference Board for all countries included in TED. Otherwise UN national accounts statistics
  • Population sources
  • 1990 onward Total Economy Database the Conference Board for all countries included in TED. Otherwise UN national accounts statistics
  • Argentina — 1800 - 1870: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307 (updated data); 1870 - 1900: Bertola, L and Ocampo, J.A. (2012) The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford, Oxford U.P
  • Belgium — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1500- 1846: Buyst, E. (2011), “Towards Estimates of Long Term Growth in the Southern Low Countries, ca.1500-1846”, Results presented at the Conference on Quantifying Long Run Economic Development, Venice, 22-24 March, 2011
  • Bulgaria — 1892-1945: Ivanov, M. (2006). “Bulgarian National Income between 1892 and 1924,” Bulgarian National Discussion Papers DP/54/2006
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Bolivia (Plurinational State of) — 1846-1950: Herranz-Loncán, A. and Peres-Cajías (2016). “Bolivian GDP per capita since the mid-nineteenth century” Cliometrica 10: 99-128
  • Brazil — 1800 - 1870: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307 (updated data); 1850–1899: Barro, R.J. and J.F. Ursua, (2008). “Macroeconomic Crises since 1870” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 255-350
  • Switzerland — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1850-2011: Stohr, Christian (2016), Trading Gains: new estimates of Swiss GDP, 1851-2008. Economic History Working Papers, 245/2016. London School of Economics and Political Science, Economic History Department, London, UK
  • Chile — 1810–2004: Díaz, J.B. Lüders, R. and Wagner, G. (2007) Economia Chilena 1810 - 2000, Producto total y sectorial una nueva mirada, Pontificia universidad Catolica de Chile, Insituto de Economia, Documeno de Trabajo no. 315
  • China — 1000-1661: Broadberry, S.N., Guan, Hanhui and David Daokui Li (2018), “China, Europe and the Great Divergence: a Study in Historical National Accounting, 980-1850”, Journal of Economic History, 78, 4, 955-1000; 1661–1933: Broadberry, S.N., Guan, Hanhui and David Daokui Li (2018), “China, Europe and the Great Divergence: a Study in Historical National Accounting, 980-1850”, Journal of Economic History, 78, 4, 955-1000; 1661–1933: Xu, Y. Z. Shi, B. van Leeuwen, Y Ni, Z Zhang, and Y Ma, (2016) 'Chinese National Income, ca. 1661-1933', Australian Economic History Review 57(3), 368–393; 1952–2008: Wu, Harry X. (2014), “China’s growth and productivity performance debate revisited – Accounting for China’s sources of growth with a new data set” The Conference Board Economics Program Working Paper Series EWP#14-01.
  • Colombia — 1800 - 1870: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307 (updated data); 1870 - 1923: Bertola, L and Ocampo, J.A. (2012) The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford, Oxford U.P.
  • Czechoslovakia — 1993 -: Based on GDP and population data for their successor states
  • Cuba — 1690–1895: Santamaria Garcia, A. (2005). Las Cuentas nacionales de Cuba, 1960 - 2005', mimeo; 1902–1958: Ward, M. and Devereux, J. (2012), “The Road Not Taken: Pre-Revolutionary Cuban Living Standards in Comparative Perspective” Journal of Economic History, 72(1): 104–132
  • Germany — 1500-1850: Pfister, U. (2022). Economic Growth in Germany, 1500–1850. The Journal of Economic History, 82(4), 1071–1107
  • Ecuador — 1833-1938: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307. (updated data). We use the growth rate between 1933 and 1938 from Prados de la Escosura (2009) and link that to the 1939 level of Maddison’s original estimates.
  • Egypt — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 700 – 1500: Pamuk, Ş. and M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011.; 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Spain — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1270-1850: Álvarez-Nogal, C. and L. Prados de la Escosura (2013). "The Rise and Fall of Spain (1270-1850)," Economic History Review, 66, 1, 1-37, using their annual benchmarks; 1850–2011: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2017), Spanish Economic Growth, 1850-2015 (London: Palgrave Macmillan)
  • Finland — 1600–1860: Eloranta, J., Voutilainen, M. and Nummela, I. (2016). “Estimating Finnish Economic Growth Before 1860” mimeo.
  • France — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1276–1800: Ridolfi, L., & Nuvolari, A. (2021). L’histoire immobile? A reappraisal of French economic growth using the demand-side approach, 1280–1850. European Review of Economic History, 25(3), 405–428
  • United Kingdom — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1252–1700 (England): Broadberry, S.N., B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015), British Economic Growth 1270-1870 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; 1700–1870: Broadberry, S.N., B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015), British Economic Growth 1270-1870 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Ghana — 1885-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Greece — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1833-1913: Kostelenos G., S. Petmezas, D. Vasiliou, E. Kounaris and M. Sfakianakis, (2007), "Gross Domestic Product 1830-1939", Sources of Economic History of Modern Greece: Quantitative data and statistical series 1830-1939, Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece, Athens.
  • Croatia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Indonesia — 1815 – 1880 (Java): Van Zanden (2012). “Economic Growth in Java 1815-1939: The Reconstruction of the Historical National Accounts of a Colonial Economy”, Maddison-Project Working Paper WP-3.; 1880-2008: Van der Eng, P. (2010). The Sources of Long-Term Economic Growth in Indonesia, 1880-2008”, Explorations in Economic History, 47: 294-309
  • India — 1600–1870: Broadberry, S.N., Custodis, J. and Gupta, B. (2015), “India and the great divergence: an Anglo-Indian comparison of GDP per capita, 1600–1871” Explorations in Economic History, 55: 58-75.
  • Iran (Islamic Republic of) — 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Iraq — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 700 – 1500: Pamuk, Ş. and M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011.; 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Iceland — 1870-1945: Jonsson, G. (1998). The gross domestic product of Iceland, 1870-1945. Nordiska Historiska Nasjonalregnkaper, Artikkelsamling from Workshop IV, Solstrand 13-15 NOvember 1998.
  • Israel — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91
  • Italy — 1451-1861: Chilosi, D., & Ciccarelli, C. (2023). Italy in the Great Divergence: What Can We Learn from Engel’s Law (SSRN Scholarly Paper 4514091).; 1861-1871 (North Italy): Malanima, P. (2010), “The long decline of a leading economy: GDP in central and northern Italy, 1300–1913” European Review of Economic History 15 (2): 169–219.; 1871-1990: Baffigi, A. (2011).”Italian National Accounts, 1861-2011”, Banca d’Italia Economic History Working Papers 18.
  • Jamaica — 1850 - 1938: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307 (updated data)
  • Jordan — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Japan — 724-1874: Bassino, Jean-Pascal & Broadberry, Stephen & Fukao, Kyoji & Gupta, Bishnupriya & Takashima, Masanori, (2018). "Japan and the Great Divergence, 730-1874," CEI Working Paper Series 2018-13, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University; 1874-1940: Fukao, K., Bassino, J.-P., Makino, T., Paprzycki, R., Settsu, T., Takashima, M., and Tokui, J. (2015) Regional Inequality and Industrial Structure in Japan: 1874-2008, Tokyo: Maruzen Publishing.
  • Kenya — 1904-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Republic of Korea — 1911-1990: Cha, M.S., Kim, N.N., Park, K.-J., Park, Y. (Eds.) (2020), Historical Statistics of Korea. Studies in Economic History, New York: Springer Publishing
  • Lebanon — 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Liberia — 1845-1950: Gardner, L. (2022). Sovereignty without Power: Liberia in the Age of Empires, 1822-1980. Cambridge University Press.
  • Mexico — 1550–1812: Arroyo Abad, L. and J.L. van Zanden (2016), “Growth under Extractive Institutions? Latin American Per Capita GDP in Colonial Times” Journal of Economic History 76(4): 1182–1215.; 1812–1870: Prados de la Escosura, L., (2009), ‘Lost decades? Economic performance in post-independence Latin America’, Journal of Latin America Studies, 41, pp. 279–307. (updated data); 1870-1895: Bértola, L., & Ocampo, J. A. (2012). The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford University Press, Table A.2; 1895–2003: Barro, R.J. and J.F. Ursua, (2008). “Macroeconomic Crises since 1870” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 255-350
  • TFYR of Macedonia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Montenegro — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Malawi — 1904-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Malaysia — 1900-1939: Nazrin Shah, S. (2017). Charting the Economy: Early 20th Century Malaya and Contemporary Malaysian Contrasts, Oxford University Press
  • Nigeria — 1885-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Netherlands — 1348–1807 (Holland): Van Zanden, J. L. and van Leeuwen, B. (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49 (2012), pp. 119–30.; 1807-1913: Smits, J.P., E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000). The Measurement of Gross National Product and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre Monograph series no 5).
  • Norway — 1820–1930: Grytten, O.H. (2015). Norwegian gross domestic product by industry 1830 - 1930, Norges Bank Working paper 19/2015. Population from Maddison (2006)
  • Panama — 1906–1945: De Corso, G. (2013). El crecimiento economico de Venuzuela, Desde la Oligarquia Conservadora Hasta La Revolucion Bolivariana: 1830-2012. Uno Vision cuantitativa *: Venezuelan Economic Growth From The Conservative Oligarchy To The Bolivarian Revolution (1830-2012), Revista De Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 31(3), 321-357. doi:10.1017/S0212610913000190
  • Peru — 1600–1812: Arroyo Abad, L. and J.L. van Zanden (2016), “Growth under Extractive Institutions? Latin American Per Capita GDP in Colonial Times” Journal of Economic History 76(4): 1182–1215.; 1812–1870: Seminario, B. (2015). El Desarrallo de la Economía Peruana en la Era Moderna, Universidad de Pacifico, Lima; 1870-1901: Bertola, L and Ocampo, J.A. (2012) The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford, Oxford U.P, Table A2
  • Poland — 1409–1913: Malinowski, M. and Van Zanden (2017), “National income and its distribution in preindustrial Poland in a global perspective” Cliometrica, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 375–40
  • D.P.R. of Korea — 1911-1940: Cha, M.S., Kim, N.N., Park, K.-J., Park, Y. (Eds.) (2020), Historical Statistics of Korea. Studies in Economic History, New York: Springer Publishing.; 1990-2011: Cha, M.S., Kim, N.N., Park, K.-J., Park, Y. (Eds.) (2020), Historical Statistics of Korea. Studies in Economic History, New York: Springer Publishing.
  • Portugal — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 1530–1850: Palma, N., & Reis, J. (2019). From Convergence to Divergence: Portuguese Economic Growth, 1527–1850. The Journal of Economic History, 79(2), 477-506. doi:10.1017/S0022050719000056
  • Romania — 1862–1995: Axenciuc, V. (2012). Produsul intern brut al Romaniei, Vol. 1, Institutl de Economie Nationala, Bucarest; 1915-1919 & 1949: Voinea, L., Cojocaru, A., Costache, B., Grigoraș, V., Lovin, H., Neagu, C., Orțan, D., & Tănase, A. (2019). One Hundred Years of Honesty: Recovering the Lost Memory of the Romanian Economy 1918-2018.
  • Russia — 1860-1885: Kuboniwa, M. (2019). Estimating GDP and Foreign Rents of the Oil and Gas Sector in the Soviet Union and Present-Day Russia. In M. Kuboniwa, Y. Nakamura, K. Kumo, & Y. Shida (Eds.), Russian Economic Development over Three Centuries: New Data and Inferences (pp. 421–438). Springer.
  • Saudi Arabia — 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Singapore — 1900–1959: Sugimoto, I. (2011), Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations, Economic Growth Centre Research Monograph ser., 2, http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/7858.html (accessed on 30 Jan. 2013).
  • Serbia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Former USSR — 1860-1885: Kuboniwa, M. (2019). Estimating GDP and Foreign Rents of the Oil and Gas Sector in the Soviet Union and Present-Day Russia. In M. Kuboniwa, Y. Nakamura, K. Kumo, & Y. Shida (Eds.), Russian Economic Development over Three Centuries: New Data and Inferences (pp. 421–438). Springer.; 1885-1913: Gregory, P. R. (1982). Russian National Income, 1885–1913, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1913-1928: Markevich, A. and M. Harrison (2011). “Great War, Civil War, and Recovery: Russia's National Income, 1913 to 1928”, The Journal of Economic History, Volume 71 (3): 672 – 703, table 6.; 1991 -: Based on GDP and population data for their successor states
  • Slovenia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project
  • Sweden — 1300–1560: Krantz, O. (2017) “Swedish GDP 1300-1560 A Tentative Estimate” Lund Papers in Economic History: General Issues; No. 152.; 1560–1950: Schön, L., and O. Krantz (2015) “New Swedish Historical National Accounts since the 16th Century in Constant and Current Prices” Lund Papers in Economic History no. 140
  • Syrian Arab Republic — 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950: Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828
  • Turkey — 1: Scheidel, W. and Friesen, S. J., ‘The size of the economy and the distribution of income in the Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies, 99 (2009), pp. 61–91; 700 - 1820: Pamuk, Ş. and M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011; Milanovic, B. (2006), “An estimate of average income and inequality in Byzantium around year 1000,” Review of Income and Wealth 52 (3).; 1500-1820: Pamuk, S. (2009). “Estimating GDP per capita for the Ottoman Empire in a European Comparative Framework, 1500-1820”, paper presented at the XVth World Economic History Congress, August 2009, Utrecht
  • Taiwan, Province of China — 1820 - 1940: Fukao, K., D. Ma and T. Yuan (2007). Real GDP in Pre-War East Asia: A 1934-36 Benchmark Purchasing Power Parity Comparison with the U.S. Review of Income and Wealth, 53 (3): 503 - 537. Trend from original Maddison estimates applied to benchmark for 1934/36
  • Uganda — 1906-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Uruguay — 1800-1870: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307. (updated data); 1870–2014: Bèrtola, L. (2016). El PIB per Capita de Uruguay 1870 - 2016: una reconstruccion. PHES working paper No 48
  • United States — 1650 - 1790: McCusker, John J., ‘Colonial Statistics’, Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Time to the Present, in S. B. Carter, S. S. Gartner, M. R. Haineset al. New York, Cambridge University Press. V-671.; 1790 - 1870: Sutch, R. (2006). National Income and Product. Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Time to the Present, in S. B. Carter, S. S. Gartner, M. R. Haineset al. New York, Cambridge University Press III-23-25.; 1800-1830: Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009). “Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America,” Journal of Latin America Studies 41: 279–307. (updated data)
  • Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) — 1830–2012: De Corso, G. (2013). El crecimiento economico de Venuzuela, Desde la Oligarquia Conservadora Hasta La Revolucion Bolivariana: 1830-2012. Uno Vision cuantitativa *: Venezuelan Economic Growth From The Conservative Oligarchy To The Bolivarian Revolution (1830-2012), Revista De Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 31(3), 321-357. doi:10.1017/S0212610913000190
  • Former Yugoslavia — 1952-2008: Milanovic (2011). Estimates provided to the Maddison-Project; 2008 -: Based on GDP and population data for their successor states
  • South Africa — 1700–1900 (Cape Colony): Fourie, J. and Van Zanden, J.L. (2013). GDP in the Dutch Cape Colony: the Nationals Accounts of a Slave-Based Society, South African Journal of Economics, vol. 81 (4): 467 - 490
  • Zambia — 1906-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.
  • Zimbabwe — 1914-1950: Broadberry, S., & Gardner, L. (2022). Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries. Explorations in Economic History, 83, 101424.

Angus Maddison's original sources (2010)

  • Argentina — 1900-1913: Unpublished annual estimates supplied by ECLA/CONADE. and quinquennial averages published in El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina, ECLA, Mexico, 1959, p. 15;; 1913-1950: IEERAL, "Estadísticas de la evolución económica de Argentina, 1913-84", Estudios, Buenos Aires, July-September, 1986.
  • Australia — 1820-1828: Butlin, N.G. 'Our 200 Years', Queesland Calendar, 1988; 1828-1860: N.G. Butlin, "Contours of the Australian Economy 1788-1860", Australian Economic Review, Sept. 1986, pp. 112-13;; 1861-1938/9: N.G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1938/9, Cambridge, 1962,pp.460-1; amdended as indicated in N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-19000, Cambridge, 1964, p. 453 and with revised deflator shown in M.W. Butlin, A Preliminary Annual Databae 1900/1901 to 1973/1974, Discussion Paper 7701, Reserve Bank of Australia, 1977, p. 41; 1938/9-1950: from expenditure aggregates in 1966/7 prices in M.W. Butlin, RS/FLW/, p.85.
  • Austria — 1830-1913: Kausel, "Oster-reichs Volkseinkommen 1830 bis 1913" in Geschichte und Ergebnisse der zentralen amtlichen Statistik in Österreich 1829-1979, Beitrage zur österreichischen Statistik, Heft 550, Vienna, 1979, pp. 692-3.; 1913-50: A. Kausel, N. Nemeth, and H. Seidel, "Oster-reichs Volkseinkommen, 1913-63", Monatsberichte des Osterreichischen Institutes für Wirtschaftsforschung, 14th Sonderheft, Vienna, August 1965, p. 38 and 42;
  • Belgium — 1846-1913: J. Gadisseur, "Contribution à l'étude de la production agricole en Belgique de 1846 à 1913", Revue belge d'histoire contemporaine, vol. IV, 1-2, 1973,; 1913-1950: C. Carbonnelle, "Recherches sur levolution de la production en Belgique de 1900à 1957", Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, no. 3, April 1959, p. 358.
  • Bangladesh — 1900-1950: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995
  • Brazil — 1900-1950: A. Maddison and Associates, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Brazil and Mexico, Oxford University Press, New York 1992;
  • Canada — 1820-1850: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1851-70: O.J. Firestone, "Canada's Changing Economy in the Second Half of the 19th Century", NBER, New York, 1957, processed, amended for 1820–70 to include income of the indigenous population (taken to be $400 per capita in 1820 and 1870); 1870-1926: M.C. Urquart and Associates, ed., Gross National Product, Canada 1870-1926: The Derivation of the Estimates, McGill Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1993, pp. 11-12 and 24-5,; 1926-1950: Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts, vol. 1, The Annual Estimates 1926-1974, Ottawa, 1975, p. 323. 1960 onwards from OECD, National Accounts.
  • Colombia — 1929 - 1950: CEPAL, Series Historicas del Crecimiento de America Latina, Santiago, 1978
  • Czechoslovakia — 1820-1913: A. Kausel, "Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1830 bis 1913", in "Geschichte und Ergebnisse der zentralen amtlichen Statistik in Österreich 1829-1979", Beiträge zum Osterreichischen Statistik, 550, Vienna, 1979.; 1913-37: F.L. Pryor, Z.P. Pryor, M. Stadnik, and G.J. Staller "Czechoslovakia Aggregate Production in the Inter-war Period", Review of Income and Wealth, March 1971, p.36.; 1937-50: G. Lazarcik, "Czechoslovak Gross National Product by Sector of Origin and Final Use, 1937, and 1948-65"", Occasional Paper 26, Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, New York, 1969.
  • Denmark — 1820-1947: S.A. Hansen, Okonomisk vaekst i Danmark, vol. II, Institute of Economic History, Copenhagen, 1974, pp. 229-32; 1947-50: Soren Larsen, "Reviderede tidsserier for produktionsvaerdi og bruttofaktorindkomst for perioden 1947- 65", CBS, Copenhagen, 1992, mimeographed.
  • Germany — 1850-1950: Hoffmann, Grumbach and Hesse, op. cit., pp. 454-5.
  • Finland — 1860-1960: R. Hjerppe, The Finnish Economy 1860-1985: Growth and Structural Change, Bank of Finland, Helsinki, 1989, pp. 198-200.
  • France — 1850-1913: Toutain, Le Produit interieur de la France de 1789 a 1982, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1987; 1920-1950: Toutain, Le Produit interieur de la France de 1789 a 1982, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1987
  • United Kingdom — 1870-1950: C.H. Feinstein, National Income Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965, Cambridge, 1972
  • Greece — 1913-1929: C. Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, 3rd edition, Macmillan, London, 1957; 1929-38 GNP at factor cost from Ekonomikos Tachydromos, 22 May 1954; 1938-50 from OEEC, Europe and the World Economy, Paris 1960, p.116.; 1929-1950: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995
  • Hungary — 1870-1913: L. Katus, "Economic Growth in Hungary during the Age of Dualism (1867-1913)" in E. Pemlenyi, ed., Social Economic Research in the History of East Central Europe, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1970, p.108 and J. Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, Princeton, 1983, pp. 291-3; 1900-42: A. Eckstein, "National Income and Capital Formation in Hungary, 1900-50", in S. Kuznets, ed., Income and Wealth, series V GNP index, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1955, p. 175; 1938-50: from L. Czirjak, "Hungarian GNP by Sectors of Origin of Product and End Uses, 1938 and 1946-67", Occasional Paper 43, Research Project on East Central Europe, New York, 1973.
  • India — 1870-1900: A. Heston, "National Income", in D. Kumar and M. Desai, Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 2, Cambridge, 1983, p. 397.; 1900-46: A. Maddison, "Alternative Estimates of the Real Product of India, 1900-46", Indian Economic and Social History Review, 22, 2, 1985.; 1946-50: A. Maddison, Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan Since the Moghuls, Allen and Unwin, London, 1971, p. 169.
  • Ireland — 1820, 1870, 1913: MPD 2013, Bolt and Van Zanden, 2014, The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts. The Economic History Review, 67(3), 627–651; 1913-1926: P. Deane (1968), and Feinstein, 1972; 1926-1950: K.A. Kennedy, Productivity and Industrial Growth: The Irish Experience, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 3.
  • Republic of Korea — 1820, 1870: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995
  • Myanmar — 1901-1938: "Trends of Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Burma 1870-1940", Journal of the Burma Research Society, 1964, p. 144; 1938-1950: E.E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, Dorsey, Homewood, Illinois, 1962, Table 18-1,
  • Netherlands — 1913-1950: C.A. van Bochove and T.A. Huitker, "Main National Accounting Series, 1900-1986", CBS Occasional Paper, No. 17, The Hague, 1987.
  • Norway — 1930-1950: Central Bureau of Statistics Norway, 1970 and Maddison, A. Monintoring the World Economy, 1995
  • New Zealand: — 1870-1939: K. Rankin, "New Zealand's Gross National Product: 1859-1939, Review of Income and Wealth, March 1992, pp. 60-1., 1870 amended to include indigenous population (taken to be $400 per capita); 1939-50: C. Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, third edition, Macmillan, London, 1957, pp. 171-2
  • Peru — 1900-1913: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1913-1941: C.A. Bolona Behr, "Tariff Policies in Peru, 1880-1980", Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1981;; 1942-1950: "Cuadros del producto interno bruto en dollares de 1950", CEPAL, Santiago, October 1962, mimeographed;; 1945-1950: Series Historicas del Crecimiento de America Latina, CEPAL, Santiago, 1978.
  • Philippines — 1820-1900: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1900-1950: R.W. Hooley, "Long Term Growth of the Philippine Economy, 1902-1961", , The Philippine Economic Journal, First Semester, 1968.
  • Poland — 1913-1929: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1929-1938: K. Laski, Akumulacja i spozycie w procesie uprzemyslowienia Polski Ludowej, Ksiazka i Wiedza, Warsaw, 1956, pp. 86-90; 1937-1950: T.P. Alton (1970), p. 46,
  • Portugal — 1850-1913: Pedro Lains, "How Far Can We Go? Measuring Portuguese Economic Growth (1850-1913)"; 1938-1950: R. Janes Cartado and N.E. Sequeira da Rosa, Series Longas as Contas Nacionais Portuguesas 1958-1985, Banco de Portugal, Lisbon,
  • Former USSR — 1928-40: R. Moorsteen and R.P. Powell, The Soviet Capital Stock 1928-1962, Irwin, Illinois, 1966, p. 361; 1945-50: R. Moorsteen and R.P. Powell, The Soviet Capital Stock 1928-1962, Irwin, Illinois, 1966, p. 362; 1950-90: CIA
  • Thailand — 1820-1900: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1900-50: Sompop Manarungsan, "Economic Development of Thailand, 1850-1950", University of Groningen, Ph. D. thesis, 1989
  • Turkey — 182, 1870: Maddison, A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1995; 1923-48: T. Bulutay, Y.S. Tezel and N. Yielderim, Turkiye Milli Geliri 1923-1948, Ankara, 1974.
  • United States — 1820-1950: GDP movement from Maddison (1995a), amended for 1820–70 to include income of the indigenous population (taken to be $400 per capita in 1820 and 1870).
  • Former Yugoslavia — 1870-1909: Maddison, A. The World Economy, a Millenial Perspective, OECD, 2001; 1909-12: I. Vinski, "National Product and Fixed Assets in the Territory of Yugoslavia 1900-59" , in P. Deane, ed., Income and Wealth, Series IX, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1961, p. 221; 1920-39: I. Vinski, "National Product and Fixed Assets in the Territory of Yugoslavia 1900-59" , in P. Deane, ed., Income and Wealth, Series IX, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1961, p. 222; 1947-52: I. Vinski, "National Product and Fixed Assets in the Territory of Yugoslavia 1900-59" , in P. Deane, ed., Income and Wealth, Series IX, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1961, p. 223

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Source: BigCapital.org — “Democracy and economic growth”, https://bigcapital.org/articles/democracy-and-economic-growth/